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Foreword
Statements of tax policy represent a conscientious effort by 
the federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate, 
develop positions on matters of tax policy covering major areas 
of taxation in which members of the accounting profession have 
special competence.
The continuing creation of new businesses and the growth of 
existing businesses have long been recognized as activities of 
social and economic necessity. Existing firms may grow through 
internal means, utilizing their own management, employees, and 
financial resources. Alternatively, they may achieve such growth 
through external means, through acquisition or merger.
The present tax treatment of transactions incident to the for­
mation of new corporate businesses and the combination of two 
or more businesses contains deficiencies that impede the proper 
functioning of these activities within the socioeconomic environ­
ment of the United States. In many situations, economic reason­
ing, which clearly dictates a particular course of action, is under­
mined by the force of tax implications that have the effect of 
misdirecting or preventing such action. Our purpose in this state­
ment is to identify alternatives to the present law that we believe 
would more closely align the tax treatment of these transactions 
with their economic substance and that would thereby restore 
a greater degree of neutrality to the decision processes of indi­
viduals (and their agents) whose economic circumstances warrant 
consideration of such transactions. The formal presentation of 
this statement will assist members of congressional tax-writing 
committees, members of the executive branch of the government, 
and the public in their consideration of the issues involved.
Statements of tax policy are approved by the executive com­
mittee of the federal tax division after they are developed by the 
division’s tax policy subcommittee. Other division subeommittees
may develop a policy statement if requested to do so. This state­
ment was approved by the 1977-78 policy subcommittee and 
executive committee.
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Introduction
Since the latter decades of the nineteenth century, corporate 
formations and corporate mergers have played a major role in 
the growth and development of the United States economy.1 The 
aggregate, long-run effects of pooling human talents and eco­
nomic resources through the establishment or combination of 
corporate enterprises have generally been realized in the form 
of accelerated rates of technological development, higher levels 
of productive efficiency, and increased output of goods and 
services. This nation’s relative strength and general prosperity, 
which has resulted in large part from these activities, is testimony 
to the general economic, social, and political desirability of the 
establishment and growth of corporate enterprises.
As a matter of public policy, the importance of the continued 
formation of new corporate businesses has been and continues to 
be widely recognized.2 Few subjects, however, have given rise to 
more heated controversy than has that of corporate mergers and
1. As used in this chapter of our analysis, a corporate acquisition or merger 
is any acquisition of one corporation’s stock or assets by another corporation 
resulting in the acquiring corporation’s operational control over the acquired 
corporation. These corporate business combinations may take any one of 
several forms (e.g., statutory merger, statutory consolidation, stock-for-stock 
acquisition, etc.), each of which is discussed in the Appendix, “Current 
Taxation of Formations and Combinations of Corporate Businesses.”
2. The establishment of new businesses has long been vigorously encouraged 
through various forms of credit guarantees, low-interest loans, advisory 
services, etc., made available through special legislation, the Department of 
Commerce, and the Small Business Administration.
their economic impact.3 The debate focuses upon two primary 
issues: the eff ect of business combinations on the competitive 
structure and the degree of industrial concentration in the Amer­
ican economy,4 and, to the extent that acquisitions and mergers
3. For the purpose of economic analysis, a merger is commonly classified 
as either a horizontal merger, a vertical merger, or a conglomerate merger. 
A horizontal merger is a combination of firms whose products are viewed 
by buyers as highly substitutable—i.e., the products have a high cross­
elasticity of demand.
The key distinction of the vertical merger is the successive functional 
relationship that exists between the acquiring and the acquired firms—the 
product of one firm is a production input for, or is marketed by, the other 
firm. Generally, the merging of a supplier and a customer is a vertical 
merger.
A conglomerate merger is any merger that is neither horizontal nor 
vertical. The respective products of the acquiring and the acquired firms are 
neither competitive nor vertically related. Thus, a completely conglomerate 
merger produces a firm having a number of external markets equal to the 
sum of the premerger external markets of the acquiring and the acquired 
firms. The resultant conglomerate firm is a market-diversified firm in that it 
operates in two or more separate product and/or geographical markets.
4. The term industrial concentration refers to the share of a particular type 
of economic activity accounted for by a small group of firms performing a 
large share of that activity. Measures of concentration have been based on 
such indicators of economic activity as sales, total assets, profits, employ­
ment, and value added by manufacture. Concentration may be examined 
with reference to the economy as a whole, for particular industries, geo­
graphical areas, or markets, and for individual products or services.
It is generally recognized that the high degree of concentration existing 
in many industries today stems largely from two waves of merger activity 
that were typified by the Standard Oil Trust in 1879 and later, at the turn 
of the century, the emergence of such corporate giants as the United States 
Steel Corporation, the American Tobacco Company, the General Electric 
Company, and the American Can Corporation. The merger movement of 
1924-1929 further increased the then prevailing levels of industrial concen­
tration. See Fred J. Weston, The Role of Mergers in the Growth of Large 
Firms (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1953), pp. 31-46; 
George J. Stigler, “Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger,” American Eco­
nomic Review 40, no. 2 (May 1950): 23-24 ; John Moody, The Truth about 
the Trusts: A Description and Analysis of the American Trust Movement 
(New York: Moody Publishing Company, 1904); and Samuel Richardson 
Reid, Mergers, Managers and the Economy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 1968), pp. 37-72. The motivation and role of mergers as a means 
of increasing concentration in affected industries in recent years (post- 
World War II to the present) is less certain. For discussions on these issues, 
see Weston, The Role of Mergers, pp. 46-49; J. Keith Butters, John Lintner, 
and William L. Cary, Effects of Taxation: Corporate Mergers (Cambridge, 
Mass.; The Riverside Press, 1951), pp. 241-280 and 287-314; George D. 
McCarthy, Acquisitions and Mergers (New York: The Ronald Press Com-
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explain the size of larger businesses, the nature and the effect of 
the resultant business power exercised by these firms over markets 
and consumers.5 The positions taken by responsible commentators 
on each of these issues vary widely from one extreme to the other. 
Although there is no unambiguous evidence about the propriety 
of these respective positions, it does appear that the direct and 
indirect socioeconomic effects of some business combinations have 
been less than favorable and that the potential for future abuse 
continues to exist.
It is not our purpose here to suggest the direction that public 
policy should or might take in establishing criteria for evaluating
pany, 1963), pp. 9-15; John C. Narver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market 
Competition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 117-137; 
Reid, Mergers, Managers and the Economy, pp. 73-120; “Industrial Struc­
ture and Competition Policy,” Study Paper no. 2, Studies by the Staff of the 
Cabinet Committee on Price Stability (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1969), part II; Peter O. Steiner, Mergers: Motives, Effects, 
Policies (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975).
5. Three different views may be found regarding the nature of business 
power and its effect on markets and consumers. One view holds that the 
U.S. economy is vigorously competitive, efficient, and progressive, with a 
long-term record of relative price stability except for periods of war or 
unsound governmental fiscal and monetary policies. See, for example, John S. 
McGee, In Defense of Industrial Concentration (New York: Praeger Pub­
lishers, 1971); Murray N. Rothbard, Power and Market: Government and 
the Economy (Menlo Park, Calif.: Institute for Human Studies, Inc., 1970); 
and Donald Dewey, The Theory of Imperfect Competition: A Radical Re­
construction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
A second position holds that industrial control over markets is well 
established and that such control has resulted in higher prices, poor product 
quality, excessive wastes, and misallocation of resources within the economy. 
See John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1967); Richard Caues, American Industry: Structure, 
Conduct, Performance (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964); 
“Industrial Structure and Competition Policy,” Study Paper no. 2, Studies 
by the Staff of the Cabinet on Price Stability (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1969); Morton Mintz and Jerry S. Cohen, 
American, Inc. (New York: Dial Press, 1971); and John M. Blair, Economic 
Concentration (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1972).
A third position holds that the available evidence on many important 
points is incomplete or ambiguous and that additional research is essential 
to sound policy decisions. See U.S., Congress, Senate, “The Role of Giant 
Corporations in American and World Economies,” Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business of 
the United States Senate, 91st Cong., July 9-11, 1969, pp. 502-513; and 
Eugene M. Singer, Antitrust Economies: Selected Legal Cases and Economic 
Models (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).
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the desirability of specific business combinations. We do believe 
that where public policy dictates that the interests of society are 
best served by preventing, limiting, or retroactively remedying a 
particular corporate acquisition or merger, the laws, regulations, 
and sanctions employed to accomplish these objectives should 
arise solely from sources outside the income tax law.6 If these laws, 
regulations, and sanctions are properly constructed and adequately 
enforced, there is simply no reason for the tax law to be burdened 
with concepts that properly lie far beyond the limits of its respon­
sibility.7 Indeed, any combinations that remain to be dealt with 
for tax purposes ( other than those whose dominant motivation is
6. Anti-trust legislation and its enforcement by the anti-trust division of the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have been and 
continue to be the primary source for the control of merger and acquisition 
activity. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, however, enacted provisions (IRC 
secs. 249, 279, 453(b)(3), and 1232) directed toward the elimination of 
“special and unwarranted inducements to mergers.” The House committee 
reports that discuss these provisions indicate congressional interest in using 
the tax law not only as a means of controlling tax avoidance in this area, 
but also as a supplement to the existing arsenal of public policy tools aimed 
at preventing certain types of business combinations that might adversely 
“affect the competitive climate in the United States.” See H. Rept. 413, 
91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, 1969-3 C.B. 263.
It has been argued by some, as it is argued here, that the question of 
curbing mergers and acquisitions is essentially an antitrust question. Chair­
man Russell Long of the Senate Finance Committee, for example, “has 
stated that he favors alleviating the problem by amending anti-trust laws 
rather than the income tax laws” Lybrand Newsletter (Lybrand, Ross, and 
Montgomery), April 1969, p. 5. In testimony before the House Ways and 
Means Committee, former Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren 
took a somewhat cautious position: “To the extent that this committee finds 
that the tax laws are in fact generating undesirable mergers, I hope that 
remedial legislation can be worked out, without prejudice to beneficial 
mergers or to legitimate borrowing” Legislative Analysis: The Conglomerate 
Merger Tax Proposal (H.R. 7489) (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research, 1969), p. 14. See also Paul Joseph Sax, 
“The Conglomerate and Tax Reform: A Brief Review,” Tax Law Review 
(Winter 1970), p. 235.
7. It has become increasingly common for the tax laws to be so burdened; 
but, is this trend in the thinking of policy-makers necessarily a desirable 
one? For an excellent discussion of this and related issues, see “Issues in 
Simplification of the Income Tax Laws,” Studies by the Staff of the Joint 
Economic Committee on Taxation (Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1977); and James S. Eustice, “Tax Complexity and the 
Tax Practitioner,” California CPA Quarterly 44, no. 2 (September 1976): 
10-17. Professor Eustice states that “The lax law is increasingly thought to 
be a solution for practically every social or economic problem that the mind 
of man can imagine. Surely there must be some limits to what this structure
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tax avoidance) would be desirable in a public policy sense and 
should therefore be facilitated, or at least not hampered, through 
the operation of “neutral” taxing provisions. One of our purposes 
in this statement is to identify and recommend changes in those 
provisions of the current law that lack neutrality and that thereby 
unnecessarily hinder business combinations or force such com­
binations to take inefficient forms.8
“Neutrality,” as the term is used here, refers to impartiality of 
treatment. Impartiality is lacking where essentially similar tax­
payers are treated differently under the tax law or where the same 
tax treatment is accorded essentially different taxpayers or trans­
actions. Partiality, where it exists, may be deliberate or it may 
arise as a result of congressional, administrative, or judicial over­
sight. To the extent taxing provisions depart from neutrality, for 
whatever reason, they become regulatory in that they then deter­
mine the directions in which taxpayers may become wealthy or 
not. The resultant tax-induced distortion of economic decisions 
can be justified only when supported by adequate public purpose 
and ample prospect for achieving that purpose.
can carry. It seems that peripheral uses of the tax system have gone too far 
afield from (its) basic goals . . . , and this has done much to further the . . . 
problems now plaguing the system” (p. 12).
8. In some situations, economic reasoning may clearly urge a particular 
combination form (i.e., statutory merger, stock-for-stock acquisition, stock- 
for-asset acquisition, use of subsidiary in a statutory consolidation, etc.); 
but, the tax implications may force the parties to choose another, less effi­
cient, form in order to obtain the benefit of nontaxability. For example, the 
business the acquiring corporation wishes to purchase may have significant 
contingent or inchoate liabilities whose potential impact is completely un­
known at the time of the purchase. In such a case, the purchaser in a stock- 
for-stock acquisition runs the risk that it may be overpaying for the acquired 
corporation’s stock. Alternatively, in a statutory merger or consolidation, the 
acquiring corporation itself usually becomes liable automatically for all of 
the acquired corporation’s known, unknown, or contingent liabilities. Thus, 
where the contingent liabilities of the acquired corporation are great (or 
the probability of unknown liabilities is high), the purchaser in a tax-free 
world might prefer a stock-for-asset exchange and thereby acquire only 
those assets it desires and assume only those debts it is willing to assume. 
However, the disparate tax treatment of these alternative methods of acqui­
sition could, under some circumstances, force the purchaser to use one of 
the less efficient forms in order to achieve the overriding objective of non­
taxability. For an excellent discussion of other common nontax factors 
affecting the choice of acquisition method, see Zolman Cavitch, Tax Plan­
ning for Corporations and Shareholders (New York: Matthew Bender, 
1977).
5
We believe that the current tax law, as it relates to the taxation 
of corporate business enterprises, contains a great many depar­
tures from neutrality that cannot be justified on the grounds of 
“adequate public purpose.”9 In a statement submitted to the 
House Committee on Ways and Means in 1976, the AICPA ex­
pressed its concern about the lack of neutrality that persists in the 
double taxation of corporate-source income and, among other 
things, about the detrimental effect this lack continues to have 
on capital accumulation.10 We recommend tax law modifications 
that would allow either a deduction to the corporation for the 
dividends it pays to its shareholders, or a tax credit to share­
holders for those taxes paid by the corporation that are attribut­
able to income distributed as d iv id end s.1 Either method would 
effectively eliminate the double tax imposed on dividend income 
and thus mitigate many of the economic ills arising under the 
current tax system.12
In this statement, we extend our interest in greater tax neu­
trality to transactions involving the transfer of property to new or 
existing corporations and to transactions in which two or more 
corporations (or partnerships) are merged into a single economic 
en terp rise .13 We believe that tax considerations should influence
9. Indeed, the businessman or investor who, today, makes his decisions 
solely on the basis of business facts without regard to tax implications is 
almost surely destined for trouble.
10. AICPA, Elimination of the Double Tax on Dividends, Statement of 
Tax Policy 3 (New York: AICPA, 1976).
11. This latter method is referred to as the “gross-up” method, since it 
would also require the shareholder to include in his income the gross amount 
of earnings out of which the dividend was paid. For illustrations of the 
computations involved under both of these approaches, see Statement of Tax 
Policy 3, Appendix 3, pp. 36-38.
12. For purposes of the recommendations we make in this statement, we 
have generally assumed that corporations (except those subject to special 
provisions, such as regulated investment companies and real estate invest­
ment trusts under subchapter M, and certain small business corporations 
under subchapter S) will continue to pay tax on their income and gains 
under the present system of double taxation. Most of our recommendations, 
however, would be the same under a tax system adopting either of the 
proposed integration methods.
13. Our recommendations pertain only to tax reform in the area of “acquisi­
tion type” reorganizations and do not include a consideration of changes 
which may be desirable in the tax treatment of “divisive-type” reorganiza­
tions (an arrangement by which shareholders of a single corporation split 
up their respective investments among several corporate shells). Nor do we
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these types of transactions as little as possible. Many of the cur­
rent provisions of subchapter C reduce the influence of tax con­
siderations by providing for the deferral of the gain or loss realized 
in certain distributions or e x ch a n g e s .14 Our recommendations 
would further reduce this influence by deferring, to the maximum 
extent consistent with the prevention of tax avoidance, the recog­
nition of taxable income, gain or loss upon a change of the form in 
which a business is conducted or upon the combination of busi­
nesses. Tax deferral would be extended to several types of trans­
actions for which deferral is not currently permitted.
We believe that the tax consequences of a combination of 
businesses or of a change in the form of organization through 
which a business is conducted should not be made to depend 
upon the size, or upon the relative sizes, of the businesses in­
volved.
Many of the current tax rules relating to these activities were 
adopted by Congress, the courts, or the Treasury Department to 
mitigate hardships or to close actual or imagined “loopholes.” We 
believe many of these rules are no longer needed and merely 
operate as hindrances to the free structuring of profit-motivated 
a c tiv itie s .15 Greater neutrality would be best achieved by elim­
inating or changing these rules, and some of our recommendations 
are directed toward that end.
Anyone proposing change must be alert to undesirable or un­
intended tax avoidance opportunities that currently exist or that 
might be created by recommended changes. The tax avoidance 
opportunities that concern us are mainly those that lead to (1) the 
realization of capital gain by a shareholder where dividend treat­
ment would be more appropriate, (2) tax deferral upon the re­
moval of property from corporate to noncorporate ownership, and 
(3) the deferral of income or gain under circumstances that allow
examine the defects in the present income and estate tax systems, which 
so strongly influence the disposal of many of the small businesses that are 
parties to reorganizations. See Butters, op. cit., and John Spenser Martin, 
Possible Tax Impact on Decisions to Merge or Sell-out Closely-Held Cor­
porations, unpublished dissertation, University of Illinois, 1970.
14. For example, sec. 351, Transfers to Controlled Corporations; sec. 354, 
Exchanges of Stock and Securities in Certain Reorganizations; and sec. 
355, Distribution of Stock and Securities of a Controlled Corporation.
15. For example, the “solely for voting stock” requirement of sec. 368 
(a)(1)(B) and (C).
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the taxpayer to avoid its taxable recognition permanently.16 Under 
our recommendations, there will be more situations in which the 
basis of assets will carry over from the transferor to the transferee. 
We believe that the various anti-tax-avoidance provisions in the 
Internal Revenue Code and the substance-over-form doctrine de­
veloped under case law are adequate to prevent tax avoidance 
through nontaxable transfers of high-basis-low-value assets to a 
transferee desiring to use the built-in loss.
16. In some cases, tax avoidance opportunities arise from provisions other 
than those directly governing reorganizations or other stockholder-corpora­
tion transactions. To the extent these opportunities are deemed undesirable, 
they should be eliminated by amending the provisions that create them, not 
by unduly restricting the flow of assets into corporate ownership or between 
corporations.
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Summary of Recommendations
The AICPA proposes several major changes in the laws cur­
rently governing the taxation of transactions incident to the for­
mation and combination of corporate business enterprises. * 
Briefly, our recommendations provide for the following:
1. Expanding the scope of the provisions that permit deferral of 
the gain (or loss) realized in certain types of transactions to 
include many transactions that would not qualify for such 
deferral under the present law.
2. Expanding the term “boot” to encompass any property re­
ceived by the transferor (including the debt instruments, or 
“securities,” of the transferee corporation) that is not an 
“equity” interest in the transferee or, in certain cases, an 
“equity” interest in its parent or subsidiary.
3. Adopting, for the purpose of determining the extent to which 
a transaction would qualify for tax deferral, attribution rules 
that recognize the economic ties of corporations related to 
each other through stock ownership.
4. Enlarging both (a)  the list of the tax attributes of a trans­
ferred “business” that would carry over to the transferee of the 
“business” and ( b ) the list of transactions that would result in 
such carryovers.
5. Establishing new rules to determine the extent to which “boot” 
received by a transferor in a partly taxable transaction should 
be treated as an ordinary dividend.
* These existing rules and their historical development are briefly reviewed 
in the Appendix.
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6. Modifying the current rules for determining the presence and 
amount of taxable “boot” when a transferee-corporation as­
sumes a transferor’s liability.
7. Reducing the number of events that would give rise to the 
recapture of certain tax credits (e.g., the investment tax 
credit) and, where recapture is appropriate, placing the bur­
den of such recapture on the transferee rather than on the 
transferor as under current law.
In regard to the taxation of combinations of noncorporate
business enterprises, we propose changes that would—
1. Prevent the “termination” of any partnership that is a party 
to a combination of partnerships.
2. Provide for the carryover of the tax characteristics of a trans­
ferred business to the continuing partnership.
10
ANALYSIS OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Formation and Combination of 
Corporate Business Enterprises
This chapter describes and explains our recommendations for 
changes in the tax treatment of the formation, enlargement, or 
combination of corporate business enterprises.1 References to 
“code,” “subchapter,” and “section” are references to the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 and its components. References to “regula­
tions” are references to the Treasury regulations. The first part 
of this policy statement identifies three basic categories of trans­
actions and the circumstances under which, in our opinion, each 
should qualify for tax deferral. This part also examines the general 
tax eonsequences to the parties involved in transactions that 
would be wholly or partially tax free under our recommendations.
In the second part we define and explain in detail some of the 
terms used in the first part and some of the new rules recom­
mended there for applying its basic provisions.
Transfer of a ''Business" to a Corporation
Conditions for Tax Deferral
Where all the essential components of an incorporated or un­
incorporated “business”2 are transferred to a corporation by one
1. The recommendations in this chapter deal with transactions presently 
described in sec. 351, Transfers to Controlled Corporations, and sec. 368(a)  
(1)(A) through (D ), Definitions Relating to Corporate Reorganizations.
2. The term business would, for this purpose, have the same meaning that 
it currently has under sections 346 and 355, except that no particular mini­
mum period of time during which the business was actively conducted 
before its transfer would be required.
According to reg. sec. 1.355-1(c ) , a business consists of “A specific 
existing group of activities being carried on for the purpose of earning
13
or more corporate or noncorporate transferor (s) ,3 the transaction 
should be nontaxable if both of the following conditions hold:
a. Our proposed “continuity of interest” test (below) is satisfied 
by the transferor or group of transferors.
b. Only the “equity” of the transferee corporation or of its 
“parent” is received in the exchange by the transferors.
We believe that transactions meeting these two requirements 
should be nontaxable regardless of the nature and extent of the 
transferors’ “control” over the transferee after the transaction. 
Thus, we would abolish the 80 percent minimum control require­
ment currently applied to many transactions involving the trans­
fer of a business.4
income or profit from only such group of activities, and the activities included 
in such group must include every operation which forms a part of, or a step 
in, the process of earning income or profit from such group. Such group of 
activities ordinarily must include the collection of income and the payment 
of expenses. It does not include—(1) the holding for investment purposes 
of stock, securities, land, or other property, including casual sales thereof 
(whether or not the proceeds of such sales are reinvested), (2 ) the owner­
ship and operation of land or buildings all or substantially all of which are 
used and occupied by the owner in the operation of a trade or business, or 
(3) a group of activities which, while a part of a business operated for 
profit, are not themselves independently producing income even though 
such activities would produce income with the addition of other activities 
or with large increases in activities previously incidental or insubstantial.” 
For examples of activities that would qualify as businesses, see reg. sec. 
1.355-1(d).
A transfer of all the essential components of a business would satisfy 
our test. This minimum requirement would not prevent the tax-free transfer 
of components that are part of the business though not essential to it.
3. The transferors need not each be the owner or co-owner of a complete 
“business.” It is enough that the transferors in the aggregate, pursuant to 
a single plan, transfer assets which together amount to a “business”—even 
though some or all of the transferors may transfer assets that, taken alone, 
would not qualify. For example, the owner-lessor of a factory building 
could join with the lessee in a tax-free transfer of the building and the 
manufacturing business carried on therein. If a group of transferors, pur­
suant to a single plan, combine assets that neither severally nor jointly have 
ever functioned as a business, but together comprise all of the elements 
needed to function as a business, the transfer of such assets to a corpora­
tion would also qualify as the transfer of a business.
4. Under present law, the transferors of a business in an exchange described 
in sec. 351 must be in “control” of the transferee immediately after the 
exchange. Control is defined in sec. 368(c) as the ownership of stock
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We also favor eliminating the “solely for voting stock” require­
ment presently applicable to some reorganizations.5 The trans­
ferors should be permitted to receive any type of the transferee’s 
or its parent’s equity, voting or nonvoting, without disqualifying 
the transaction for tax deferral.
Current law permits an acquiring corporation in a reorganiza­
tion to give either its own stock or that of the corporation that 
controls it within the meaning of section 368(c ) ( the 80 percent- 
80 percent test described in note 4 ) .6 Current law also permits an 
acquiring corporation to transfer part or all of the acquired assets 
or stock to a corporation it controls.7
We recommend relaxing the requirements for use of parent 
stock or transfers to a subsidiary by an acquiring corporation in 
two ways:
1. We would reduce the required ownership to more than 50 
percent of the net voting power (from the current 80 percent- 
80 percent control).
2. In measuring net voting power, we would use the attribution 
rules described in the special rules and definitions, below, 
and permit the use of equity in a “parent” more than one tier 
above the acquiring corporation and the transfer of acquired 
stock or property to a “subsidiary” more than one tier below
possessing at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all 
classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80 percent of the total number 
of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.
5. The “solely for voting stock” requirement applicable to type B and, to 
a lesser extent, type C reorganizations has been the subject of a great deal 
of criticism by commentators in this area. See, for example, Richard R. 
Dailey, “The Voting Stock Requirement of B and C Reorganizations,” Tax 
Law Review, 26 (May 1971): 725-779; Thomas J. Henry, “Solely for 
Voting Stock Test Clouds Practical Mergers by ‘C’ Reorganizations,” Journal 
of Taxation 14 (May 1961): 266-269; and Frank S. Deming, “How ‘Solely’ 
Is Solely for Voting Stock: Current Problems in ‘B’ and ‘C’ Reorganizations,” 
N.Y.U. Institute on Federal Taxation 29 (1971): 397-418.
In addition to preventing tax deferral in many deserving transactions, 
this requirement also permits taxpayers to avoid nontaxability (e.g., so that 
a loss will be recognized) almost at will by embellishing an otherwise 
qualified exchange with a relatively small amount of boot, or with nonvoting 
shares.
6. Sec. 368(a)(1)(B) and (C) and (2)(D) and (E ).
7. Sec. 368(a)(2)(C).
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the acquiring corporation, provided the parent or subsidiary
meets the net-voting-power test.
The privileges of using parent equity and of transferring 
property or stock to a subsidiary would be available to the acquir­
ing corporation in any of the transactions described in this part.
After an exchange of a business for equity, the transferor(s) 
may retain the equity received in the transaction. However, if the 
transferor is a corporation, it may distribute the equity so received 
to its own shareholders. If the transferor exchanged substantially 
all its properties, the transaction resembles the type C reorganiza­
tion of present law [sec. 368(a)(1)(C)] except for the more 
relaxed requirements we recommend above. Under our recom­
mendations, as under present law, the exchange by the share­
holders of their equity in the transferor corporation for the equity 
received from the acquiring corporation would be nontaxable 
( except to the extent of boot received by them) only if the trans­
feror corporation exchanges substantially all its assets. If the trans­
feror corporation were permitted to distribute the equity received 
to its own shareholders and retain a business, our recommenda­
tions would lead to a liberalization of the rules of section 355, 
which deals with divisive reorganizations. Divisive reorganiza­
tions are outside the scope of this statement, and we take no posi­
tion on whether their treatment should be changed. Current law 
allows a corporation to enter into a type C reorganization even 
if it does not own a “business,” and we would continue this treat­
ment if substantially all of the transferor corporation’s assets are 
exchanged.8
The “Continuity of In terest Test
Under the current judicially developed rules, even those re­
organizations satisfying the strict statutory requirements will not 
qualify for tax deferral unless the character of the transferor’s in­
terest in the transferee corporation indicates a substantial con­
tinuation of the transferor’s prior economic interest. There is at 
present no clear-cut rule for what will or will not satisfy this 
“continuity of interest” requirement. We recommend that the con-
8. Provided it is not an “investment company” subject to sec. 368(a)
(2)(F ).
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tinuity-of-interest test be statutorily defined to require that at 
least 20 percent of the total aggregate value of all equity and boot 
received by the transferors be retained by them “immediately 
after” the transaction in the form of equity.9 If the transferor is a 
corporation, we would measure the retained holdings by including 
those retransferred to, and retained by, a “subsidiary” within the 
meaning of our proposed attribution rules, below. The term 
immediately after would have the same meaning that it presently 
has in transactions requiring the transferors to be in control of the 
transferee “immediately after” the exchange.10 If a transferor 
corporation redistributes the equity to its shareholders, the 
continuity-of-interest test must be met by them.11
Only “Equity” Can Be Received Tax Free
“Securities” treated as “boot.” Under our recommendations, 
any property that is received by the transferor(s) in an otherwise 
nontaxable exchange and that is not “equity” in the transferee or 
its parent would be treated as “boot.” All corporate indebtedness, 
regardless of whether it is represented by a ninety-day nonnego- 
tiable note or by a twenty-year bond listed on an exchange, would 
therefore be considered boot because it is not a proprietary, or
9. To illustrate the application of this test, assume the following facts: Ten 
partners (each owning an equal interest in the partnership) transfer their 
entire manufacturing business to X Corporation and, thereby, dissolve the 
partnership. In exchange for the business, X Corporation pays each of eight 
of the partners $10,000 in cash. The remaining two partners receive X 
Corporation equity having a combined value of $20,000.
Since the subject of the transfer was a “business,” the tax consequences 
arising from the exchange would not be dependent upon the degree of 
“control” in the hands of the transferors immediately after the exchange. 
However, the “continuity of interest” test would apply. Since two of the 
transferors retain a combined 20 percent of the total consideration received 
by the transferor group in the form of X  Corporation equity, the exchange 
satisfies the “continuity of interest” test. To the two partners receiving only 
X Corporation equity, the exchange is nontaxable. The remaining transferors 
received none of the transferee’s equity and, therefore, would recognize the 
full amount of the gain or loss they realized on the exchange.
10. Momentary retention of the transferee’s equity, therefore, would not be 
sufficient if (1) the transferors agreed before the exchange to transfer 
enough of their equity so as to fail the “continuity of interest” test or (2) 
such a transfer was an integral part of the plan under which the exchange 
was consummated.
11. Cf. sec. 3 5 1 (c ).
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equity, interest in the transferee corporation.12 This treatment 
would be a departure from current law governing transactions 
described in section 351, under which the transferee corporation’s 
“securities” (that is, evidences of indebtedness which rise to the 
dignity of “securities”) may be received tax-free by the trans- 
feror(s) of property who control the corporation immediately 
after the exchange. A transferor would no longer be able to re­
ceive tax-free any debt instruments of the transferee in exchange 
for assets.13
The treatment of securities as boot is not intended to change 
the current tax treatment of a person who was a creditor of the 
transferred business before the transaction. Under our recom­
mendations, a creditor of the transferred business would be per­
mitted to become a creditor of the successor enterprise without 
adverse tax effect. No gain or loss would be recognized by the 
creditor to the extent that any notes or securities received by him 
represented merely the conversion of his pre-existing creditor 
interest in the old business into a creditor interest in the new 
corporate debtor.14
12. Although throughout the statutory history of sec. 351, transferors have 
been permitted to receive “securities” tax-free in the exchange, our position 
is not without support in the case law dealing with such transactions (and 
analogous reorganization provisions). For example, in LeTulle v. Scofield, 
309 U.S. 694 (1940 ), 40-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶(9150, a corporation transferred 
all its assets to another corporation for cash and bonds of the transferee 
corporation. The Supreme Court held that even though “securities” were 
received by the transferors, the transaction was not tax-free: “Where the 
consideration is wholly in the transferee’s bonds, or part cash and part such 
bonds, we think it cannot be said that the transferor retains any proprietary 
interest in the enterprise. On the contrary he becomes a creditor of the 
transferee; and we do not think that the fact . . . that the bonds were 
secured solely by the assets transferred and that, upon default, the bond­
holder would retake only the property sold, changes his status from that of 
a creditor to one having a proprietary stake, within the purview of the 
statute.” See also Roebling v. Comm., 143 F.2d 810, 44-2  U.S. Tax Cas. 
¶9388 (3d Cir. 1944). These cases, in effect, hold that the receipt of only 
securities by the transferor does not give him a continuity of interest in the 
enterprise.
13. Since the establishment of many “thin” corporations is based upon the 
tax-free receipt of “securities” in a sec. 351 exchange, this proposal can be 
expected to reduce the number and magnitude of tax problems arising in 
this troublesome area of corporate income taxation.
14. Under present law, gain would be recognized by the creditor only if 
the face or principal amount of the securities received exceeded the face
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This treatment would apply even if the creditor also owns or 
receives equity in the transferee. However, since a sole proprietor 
cannot own a debt of his own enterprise, he could not receive a 
debt of its transferee tax free upon the incorporation of his busi­
ness. If a partnership is indebted to one or more of its partners, we 
believe that it should be treated as a group of sole proprietors to 
determine the tax consequences of the assumption of such debt by 
the transferee corporation. If the debt is owed to all the partners 
in the ratio of their interests, each partner’s share of the debt 
is in substance owed to himself, and the entire assumption of the 
debt by the transferee would be treated as boot. If the debt 
assumed by the corporation is owed disproportionately to the 
partners, the amount of boot received by each partner would be 
that portion of the assumed debt that could have been eliminated 
by a proportionate forgiveness of debts by all partners. For ex­
ample, assume that A and B hold 25 percent and 75 percent in­
terests in Partnership AB, and that AB owes $90,000 to A and 
$60,000 to B. Of the total debt, $80,000 could be eliminated by 
proportionate (25/75) forgiveness ($20,000 by A and $60,000 
by B ), which would leave AB owing $70,000 to A. If, upon the 
incorporation of the partnership, the transferee corporation as­
sumed only the remaining $70,000 debt owed to A, neither A nor 
B would be treated as having received boot.15 But if the transferee 
assumed the full $150,000 debt, A would have boot of $20,000 
($90,000 assumed less $70,000 disproportionate) and B would 
have boot of $60,000 ($60,000 assumed less $0 disproportionate).16
Treatment of Liabilities Assumed by the Transferee. Under 
general principles of taxation, if a taxpayer transfers property and, 
incident to the transfer, the transferee assumes a liability of the
or principal amount of the debt instrument surrendered [secs. 354(a)(2) 
and 356 (d )].
15. Unless the assumption triggers boot treatment under sec. 357(b ) (pres­
ence of a tax avoidance motive) or sec. 357(c) (liabilities assumed by the 
transferee exceed transferor’s basis in the transferred assets).
16. Although it can be argued that 25 percent of A’s remaining $70,000 
claim is in substance owed by A to himself, we believe that the incorpora­
tion of partnerships would become prohibitively complex and expensive if 
partners were treated as having received boot even after elimination of all 
proportionate debts. Sec. 357(b) may have to be expanded to prevent 
abuses of these rules.
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transferor or takes property subject to a liability, the amount of 
such liability is considered part of the consideration received by 
the transferors.17 If this rule were applied to incorporations or com­
binations of going businesses, few such transactions would be tax 
free. Since the transferee ordinarily takes the business subject to 
its business debts, many transactions could not qualify as non- 
taxable and, in those that could qualify, the amount of boot would 
be so great as to make them largely or fully taxable anyway.
Therefore, section 357(a) provides an exception to the general 
rule. If a person transfers property to a corporation in an incor­
poration or reorganization, and in the same transaction the cor­
poration assumes a liability of the transferor or takes property sub­
ject to a liability, this relief from the debt is not considered boot. 
However, this favorable treatment does not apply if “taking into 
consideration the nature of the liability and the circumstances in 
the light of which the arrangement for the assumption or acquisi­
tion was made, it appears that the principal purpose of the tax­
payer with respect to the assumption or acquisition . . . was a 
purpose to avoid federal income tax on the exchange, or . . . was 
not a bona fide business purpose.”18 Nor does it apply ( in a sec­
tion 351 exchange and in reorganizations described in section 
3 6 8 (a ) (1 ) (D ) )  if the total liabilities transferred by the trans­
feror exceed the aggregate adjusted basis of all the properties 
transferred by him. The excess of liabilities over the aggregate ad­
justed basis represents taxable gain under section 357(c) .19
We would retain the general rule of section 357(a) but would 
modify the first exception as follows.
Currently, if the transferor’s principal purpose with respect to 
any transferred liability is tax avoidance, all of the liabilities as­
sumed by or transferred (with property) to the transferee cor­
poration will be treated as boot. This is also true where any 
transferred liability lacks a business purpose. The extremely harsh
17. Crane v. Comm., 331 U.S. 1 (1947), 47-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ¶ 217.
18. Sec. 357(b ). See Frank M. Burke and Sam W. Chisholm, “Section 
357: A Hidden Trap in Tax Free Incorporations,” Tax Law Review 25 (Jan­
uary 1970): 211.
19. If the transferor in the exchange is a corporation and the transfer en­
compasses substantially all of its assets, the excess of liabilities over basis 
would not be treated as boot, just as such excess is not treated as boot under 
present law in “type A” and “type C” reorganizations [sec. 357 (c) ].
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results that can arise under this all-or-nothing rule seem punitive; 
we recommend that it be amended.20 The existence of one im­
proper purpose” liability should not taint all other liabilities. Thus, 
we believe that only those liabilities transferred for the principal 
purpose of tax avoidance should be treated as boot. We also be­
lieve that where there is no tax avoidance motive, a transferor 
should not be penalized simply because a business purpose cannot 
be proved.
Effects of Transaction: Transferor
Receipt o f Boot
Under our recommendations, if a business is transferred to a 
corporation solely in exchange for the transferee’s or its parent’s 
equity, no gain or loss would be recognized by the transferor(s) 
regardless of the nature and extent of their interest in the trans­
feree immediately after the transaction. Nor would the trans- 
feror(s) be required to recapture any of the tax benefits asso­
ciated with the transferred property.21
When a transferor receives boot in addition to equity in a 
transaction that otherwise qualifies for tax deferral, gain, but not 
loss, would be recognized to the extent of the value of the boot 
received. Since the subject matter of the transfer is property com­
prising a business and not the equity of a corporation, any gain 
recognized by the transferor would not be treated as a dividend, 
but rather as gain arising from a sale or exchange of property. The 
character of the gain would therefore be determined by reference 
to the character and holding period of the transferred assets.
If the transferor is a corporation that distributes part or all of 
the boot received pursuant to the plan of reorganization, gain 
would be recognized (as under current law) only to the extent 
of the value of the boot which is not distributed.22
20. For example, if a transferor has the transferee corporation assume a 
$30,000 mortgage on transferred property (business purpose present), but 
in the same transaction causes the corporation to assume a $1,000 personal 
debt (business purpose lacking), the entire $31,000 would be treated as 
boot under sec. 357(b ).
21. For example, depreciation recapture under secs. 1245 and 1250.
22. Sec. 361(b ).
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Basis and Holding Period o f Equity and Boot
A transferor’s basis and holding period in the equity and boot 
received in the exchange would be determined in the same man­
ner in which a transferor’s basis and holding period in “stock or 
securities” and boot are determined under present law.2323
Recapture of Certain Credits
Under current law, if a taxpayer disposes of “section 38 prop­
erty,” or if the property ceases to qualify as section 38 property 
before the end of the required holding period, part or all of the 
investment tax credit may have to be recaptured. However, where 
the premature “disposition” is nothing more than the “mere 
change in the form of conducting the taxpayer’s trade or busi­
ness,” the transferor is not required to recapture the credit as long 
as the property is retained in such trade or business as section 38 
property and the transferor himself retains a “substantial interest” 
in such trade or business.24 We propose a further liberalization of 
this rule. Since existing rules require recapture if either the trans­
feree business disposes of the section 38 property or the transferor 
disposes of a substantial part of his interest in the business, the 
credit must often be recaptured even where the property con­
tinues to be used in the business. Similar problems may arise 
in a number of other situations outside the scope of this statement, 
including that of a corporation that elects subchapter S status while 
owning investment credit property.
In order to make it easier to transfer businesses and interests 
in businesses, we recommend that the investment credit be re­
captured only if the property ceases to qualify as section 38 prop­
erty in the hands of the owner or the transferee owner, or is dis­
posed of in a transaction which requires recapture before the
23. Secs. 358 and 1223(1).
24. According to the regulations, a transferor will be considered as having 
retained a “substantial interest” in the business only if, after the change in 
form, his interest is substantial in relation to the total interest of all persons 
or is at least equal to his interest prior to the change in form [reg. sec. 
1.47-3(f) (2 ) and (6 ) , examples 1, 3, and 4]. Section 47 (b ) also exempts 
from recapture transfers by death and transactions to which section 381(a) 
applies.
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credit is fully earned. The mere disposition of an interest in the 
organization that owns the property should not give rise to re­
capture. Whenever the property is prematurely disposed of or 
ceases to qualify as section 38 property, the resulting recapture 
should fall on the taxpayer who disposes of it or its then sub­
chapter S shareholders, partners, or beneficiaries.25 Thus, it may 
be that one person will receive the benefit of the credit and that 
another must repay it. This change would result in the same treat­
ment for investment credit recapture as is presently provided for 
depreciation recapture.
Similar rules should apply to the credit for work incentive 
programs and other business incentive credits that may be 
enacted.
We believe that the tax avoidance opportunities inherent in 
this recommendation are insubstantial. Where the acquisition of 
section 38 property and its subsequent disposition to a transferee 
in a nontaxable transaction are part of a plan designed to enable 
the transferor to claim the investment credit that should go to the 
transferee, the well-established “step transaction” doctrine would 
prevent this tax-avoidance-motivated shifting of the credit. This 
doctrine would likewise prevent tax avoidance where, as a part 
of a single plan, the transfer of the section 38 property is followed 
by the disposition of the transferor’s interest in the transferee.
Effects of Transaction: Stockholders of the Transferor
If the transferor corporation has exchanged substantially all 
its assets and redistributes the equity received in the exchange, 
its shareholders will recognize no loss and will recognize gain 
or dividend income or both only to the extent of the value of the 
boot they receive. The rules for determining their gain, dividend 
income, basis, and holding period are the same as for transferors 
of equity in a direct exchange of equity for equity, and they are, 
therefore, discussed below.
25. Under current law, the burden of the investment credit recapture falls 
on the transferor who originally claimed the credit, regardless of whether 
his action or that of the transferee causes the recapture [reg. sec. 1.47-3(f) 
(5) and (6 ) , example (2 )] .
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Effects of Transaction: Transferee
Recognition of Gain or Loss
The receipt of money or other property by a corporation in 
exchange for its own capital stock (including treasury stock) 
produces neither gain nor loss for the recipient corporation.26 
Thus, where a corporation acquires a business using only its own 
or its parent’s equity as consideration, it recognizes no gain or loss. 
If, however, the acquiring corporation gives up boot in the ex­
change, it would recognize gain or loss to the extent that the value 
of the boot diff ers from the acquiring corporation’s tax basis in 
the boot property. The character of the gain would depend upon 
the character and holding period of the boot property.
Under our recommendations, debt given by the acquiring 
corporation would be considered boot, and the amount of such 
boot would be measured by the fair market value of the debt. Any 
difference between the value of the debt and its face amount 
would be treated as a bond premium or discount.
Basis and Holding Period o f Acquired Property
The acquiring corporation’s basis and holding period in the 
property it acquires in the exchange would be determined under 
the same rules as are presently applicable to such acquisitions. 27
Carryover of Tax Attributes
Under section 381, a corporation that acquires substantially 
all the properties of another corporation in a reorganization or in 
certain liquidations also acquires many of the tax benefits, privi­
leges, elective rights, and tax burdens of the predecessor corpora­
tion. Our recommendations expand the list of transactions that 
would lead to a carryover of tax attributes to include any acquisi­
tion of a business by a corporation if our proposed continuity-of- 
interest test is met.28 Carryover would be required regardless of
26. Sec. 1032. Under the reorganization rules, parent stock can also be 
given (n. 6, supra).
27. Secs. 362 and 1223(2).
28. That is, if at least 20 percent of the aggregate value of all equity and 
boot transferred in the exchange is retained by the transferors immediately
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whether or not the business was incorporated before the exchange 
and whether or not it was the transferor’s only business.29
We believe that the carryover of the tax characteristics of the 
predecessor corporation should not be subject to any rules more 
rigorous than our proposed continuity-of-interest test (including 
those now referred to in sections 382 and 383). All such character­
istics were generated by the enterprise and, if our continuity-of- 
interest test is met, should continue with the enterprise regardless 
of changes in ownership.
Our recommendations would also enlarge the list of tax 
attributes to be carried over to the successor corporation. We be­
lieve that all special tax characteristics associated with the trans­
ferred business (as distinguished from those associated with the 
transferor itself or the transferor’s retained property) should be 
carried over to the acquiring corporation. These carryover char­
acteristics would include (but not be limited to) all recapture 
potentials, the deductibility of unfunded pension costs and de­
ferred compensation arrangements relating to those employees of 
the transferor who will continue to be employed by the transferee, 
all accounting methods ( including accelerated depreciation 
methods used by the transferred business), as well as (to the 
extent they are attributable to the transferred business) any net 
operating loss carryovers, operations loss carryovers of life insur­
ance companies, contributions carryovers, and foreign tax credit 
carryovers. If the acquiring corporation is already in the same 
business as the acquired business, any conflict of methods would 
be resolved according to the principles of the present regulations 
under section 381.30
The determination or allocation of items attributable to the 
transferred business should be based upon an analysis of the 
source of the item involved, rather than upon a mechanical pro­
ration according to the relative fair market values of the assets
after the transaction in the form of the acquiring corporation’s equity (or 
that of its parent).
29. Although the expanded carryover of tax characteristics recommended 
below would apply regardless of whether the transferor is a corporation or 
an unincorporated owner, some carryovers would probably need to remain 
with the transferor unless the transferor is a corporation. This treatment 
would apply with respect to carryovers the tax treatment of which differs 
materially between corporate and noncorporate taxpayers.
30. Reg. sec. 1 .381(c) ( 4 ) - l .
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transferred and those retained by the transferor.31 Where the 
transferor is a corporation that remains in existence after the ex­
change, its earnings and profits would remain unchanged except 
for the increase required for gain recognized in the exchange.
Transfers to a Corporation of Property Other 
Than a Business
Transactions Qualifying for Tax Deferral
Section 351 is currently the only provision that allows an un­
incorporated taxpayer to transfer property tax free to a new or 
existing corporation. Under the current law, gain or loss realized 
by the transferor(s) is deferred only if immediately after the ex­
change the transferor or group of transferors own at least 80 per­
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of the 
transferee’s voting stock and at least 80 percent of the total num­
ber of shares of all other classes. If this control requirement is 
satisfied, the transaction, with respect to each individual trans­
feror, is tax free to the extent that only the “stock or securities” 
of the transferee are received in the exchange. When the transfer 
includes all essential parts of a business, our recommendations 
would change these rules as described above under “Transfer of 
a Business to a Corporation.” Thus, section 351 would become 
superfluous for transfers of a business and also for transfers of 
substantially all the assets of a corporation.32
However, section 351 serves other useful purposes, and we 
would retain it in amended form. It permits the tax-free transfer 
of any property (including property that does not by itself 
amount to a complete business), and thus makes it easier for a 
corporation to acquire additional assets. A partner is permitted 
tax-free transfer of assets to his partnership regardless of his per­
centage interest in the partnership,33 and strict tax neutrality,
31. For example, assume the transferor has a foreign tax credit carryover 
attributable partly to the transferred and partly to a retained business. The 
allocation between the businesses would be based not on their relative 
values but on the foreign taxes paid or incurred by each business and on 
the extent to which the transferor has been able to use such taxes as credits 
as a result of the operations of the businesses.
32. See “Effect of Transaction: Stockholders of the Transferor,” p. 23.
33. Sec. 721.
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therefore, would demand the elimination of the section 351 “con­
trol” requirement, so that any transfer of property for equity 
would become tax free. On the other hand, a transfer of a small 
amount of property in exchange for a minute equity interest in a 
large corporation is similar to a sale. We recommend that where 
the property transferred to the corporation is property other than 
all the essential elements of a business, neither gain nor loss be 
recognized if both of the following conditions exist:
1. The transferor(s) receives only the equity of the transferee or 
its parent.
2. After the exchange, the transferors own more than 50 percent 
(instead of at least 80 percent) of the value of the transferee 
corporation’s or its parent’s total outstanding equity.
In making this test, our proposed attribution rules ( set forth in the 
definitions section that follows) would apply. Unlike the current 
“80 percent control” test, the new test would disregard the type of 
the equity (voting or nonvoting) owned by the transferor(s). If 
a transaction qualified under these rules, and also as a transfer of 
a business to a corporation, the more liberal rules for transfers of a 
business would apply.
Where the transferor(s) receives boot in addition to the trans­
feree’s equity, gain, but not loss, would be recognized to the ex­
tent of the value of the boot. Securities received by the trans­
feror(s) would be treated in the same manner and under the 
same rules as would securities received by transferor(s) of a busi­
ness.34 Similarly, the rules proposed for the treatment of liabilities 
assumed by the transferee corporation in an exchange of a busi­
ness would also apply to the transactions described here.35
Effects of Transaction: Transferor
Receipt o f Boot. Boot received by the transferor(s) in an 
otherwise nontaxable exchange would generally be treated under 
our recommendations the same as under the present law. Any 
gain, but not loss, realized by a transferor in the exchange would 
be recognized to the extent of the fair market value of boot re­
ceived. The character of the gain would generally depend upon 
the character of the assets transferred by the transferor. However,
34. See “Securities Treated as Boot,” p. 17.
35. See “Treatment of Liabilities Assumed by the Transferee,” p. 19.
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we recommend that more specific rules be enacted to clarify the 
tax treatment of boot received by a transferor in exchange for 
corporate equity. When the property transferred to the corpora­
tion includes equity in another corporation, the receipt of boot 
could have the effect of a dividend, and its tax treatment should 
be determined under the rules discussed below for similar ex­
changes in a reorganization when boot is received by the trans­
feror (s).36
Basis and Holding Period o f Properties Received. A trans­
feror’s basis and holding period in the equity and boot received in 
the exchange would be determined in the same manner that a 
transferor’s basis and holding period in stock or securities and 
boot is determined under present law.37
Effects o f Transaction: Transferee
The tax consequences for a transferee corporation would be 
the same as for a transferee of a business, except that there would 
be a carryover of only those tax attributes inherent in the property 
transferred (for example, depreciation recapture potential).
Reorganizations Involving Exchanges of Equity 
for Equity
Conditions for Tax Deferral
We recommend liberalizing the reorganization provisions 
(mainly section 3 6 8 ( a) ( 1 ) ( B) ) ,  which now permit tax-free ex­
changes of stock in one corporation for stock in another. Our 
recommendations for changes in these provisions are analogous to 
some of those already presented. We would abolish the solely-for- 
voting-stock requirement of current law by permitting the acquir­
ing corporation to give any type of its or its parent’s equity with­
out disqualifying the transaction. Rather than require control 
within the meaning of section 368(c) (the 80 percent control 
test), we would require only that the acquiring corporation or its 
subsidiary hold more than 50 percent of the total value of the 
acquired corporation’s outstanding equity after the exchange. In
36. See “Effects of Transaction: Transferor,” p. 30.
37. Secs. 358 and 1223(1).
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making this test, our proposed attribution rules ( as set forth in the 
section on definitions, below) would apply.
Under our recommendations, a direct exchange of corporate 
equity for corporate equity can be nontaxable under one of two 
different provisions, or under both of them:
1. If, after the transaction, the transferee corporation owns more 
than 50 percent of the equity in the other corporation, the ex­
change would be a nontaxable stock acquisition under our 
recommendations here.
2. If, after the transaction, the transferor(s) owns more than 50 
percent of the equity in the transferee corporation, the ex­
change would be nontaxable under our recommendations for 
transfers to a corporation of property other than a business.
Effects o f Transaction: Transferor(s)
Our recommendations for the tax treatment of the trans- 
feror(s) of stock apply not only to those transferors who par­
ticipate in a direct equity-for-equity exchange described in the 
immediately preceding paragraph, but also to those who, in ex­
change for the transferee’s equity, transfer equity in a section 
351 transaction or surrender part or all of their equity in a cor­
poration that has transferred substantially all its assets to another 
corporation.
Under present law, in a stock-for-stock exchange, the assump­
tion of a liability of the transferor or taking the transferred equity 
subject to a liability is treated as boot because section 357 does 
not apply to exchanges under section 354. We would continue this 
rule.
The transferor’s basis and holding period in the property re­
ceived in the exchange ( that is, the acquiring corporation’s equity, 
or both boot and equity) would be determined as under current 
law.38
38. Secs. 358 and 1223 (1 ). The basis of boot received will be its fair market 
value, and its holding period starts when it is received. The basis of equity 
will be the transferor’s basis in the equity given up, minus the value of boot 
received, minus debt transferred to the acquiring corporation (to the extent 
such debt is not already included in boot), plus the amount of dividend 
taxed and the amount of gain recognized by the transferor. The holding 
period will usually carry over from the equity surrendered to the equity 
received.
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Receipt o f Boot
Where boot is received in an otherwise tax-free exchange by 
persons who have given equity in the exchange, the question 
arises, under current law and under our recommendations, 
whether and to what extent the value of boot received by such 
persons is to be taxed as a dividend.
1. Exchange proceeds or dividend income?
Under current law, if boot is received in an otherwise tax- 
free reorganization exchange, any gain realized by the re­
cipient is taxable to the extent of the value of the boot re­
ceived.39 Loss is not recognized.40 The recognized gain is 
treated as a dividend if the exchange has the “eff ect” of a 
dividend distribution.41 To the extent that it does not have this 
“effect,” the gain is treated as realized from an exchange and is 
usually a capital gain. Uncertainty arises, however, because 
neither the code nor the regulations indicate how to determine 
whether an exchange has this “effect.” It is likely that any boot 
received in a combination of corporations will be treated as 
a dividend unless the transferor has no equity interest in 
the acquiring corporation after the exchange (although a 
“meaningful-reduction-of-stock-ownership” test seems to be 
developing).42
In order to reduce this uncertainty and to apply similar tax 
rules to transactions with similar economic effect, we recom­
mend that the treatment of boot received by the shareholders
39. Sec. 35 6 (a ).
40. Sec. 3 5 6 (c ).
41. Sec. 356(a) (2 ).
42. In Comm. v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 (1945), 45-1 U.S. Tax 
Gas. ¶9311 (1945), the Supreme Court indicated that the mere existence 
of undistributed accumulated earnings and profits was enough to give the 
distribution the effect of a dividend. However, several lower courts have 
rejected any such mechanical approach in making this determination. In­
stead, a meaningful reduction in the shareholder’s proportionate interest has 
been sufficient to render the boot distribution not equivalent to a dividend. 
See, for example, Shimberg v. U.S., 415 F. Supp. 832 (D. Fla. 1976), 76—2 
U.S. Tax Gas. ¶9565; Wright v. U.S., 482 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1973), 73 -2  
U.S. Tax Gas. ¶9583; and Idaho Tower Co. v. U.S., 161 F. Supp. 807 (Ct. 
Cl. 1958), 58-1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶9511. See also Bruce D. Shoulson, “Boot 
Taxation: The Blunt Toe of the Automatic Rule,” Tax Law Review 20 
(March 1965): 573. Note that in some situations a taxpayer may prefer a 
dividend to a long-term capital gain.
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in any equity-for-equity exchange be determined under the 
rules, slightly modified, of sections 302 through 306.43 For this 
purpose, we would not compare the transferor’s percentage 
ownership in the acquired  corporation before the transaction 
with his percentage ownership in the acquiring corporation 
after the transaction.44 Instead, we would compare his pre­
reorganization percentage interest in the acquired  corporation 
with the percentage he receives of the total equity given up 
by the acquiring corporation. For example, assume that Stock­
holder N owns 60 percent of the stock of Corporation A. As­
sume further that Corporation B acquires all of the stock of 
Corporation A in exchange for cash and its own stock. In the 
transaction, N receives cash plus 45 percent of all the B stock 
that is given by B to acquire all the stock of A. The boot ( that 
is, the cash) N receives in this exchange would not be divi­
dend since, after the transaction, N, as compared to the other 
former shareholders of Corporation A, owns (1) less than 80
43. Secs. 302 through 304 describe the tax treatment of stock redemptions. 
In a stock redemption, the corporation, in exchange for its own stock, dis­
tributes cash or property to the shareholder in payment for the stock and 
continues business as before. Ordinarily, a sale of stock would result in a 
capital gain or loss to the selling shareholder if, as is the usual case, the 
stock was a capital asset in his hands. However, if a redemption fails to 
qualify for sale or exchange treatment under sec. 302 through 304, the 
entire distribution will be treated as a dividend to the shareholder. Gener­
ally, a redemption will qualify as a sale or exchange if all of a shareholder’s 
stock is redeemed, if it is “substantially disproportionate,” or if it is “not 
essentially equivalent to a dividend” (sec. 302). Special rules apply where 
the stock of a corporation is redeemed by its sister corporation, where the 
stock of a parent corporation is acquired by its subsidiary from a share­
holder of the parent (sec. 304), or where the redeemed stock was included 
in the estate of a decedent (sec. 303).
Section 305 deals with the taxation of stock dividends. Under section 
306, the redemption, sale, or disposition of certain types of stock (usually 
preferred stock previously issued as a nontaxable dividend) may result in 
ordinary income.
44. Under sec. 302(b ) (2 ) ,  a redemption is “substantially disproportionate” 
(and thus not a dividend) only if (1) immediately after the redemption, 
the ratio of the shareholder’s voting power (including voting preferred 
stock) to the corporation’s total outstanding voting powers is less than 80  
percent of such ratio immediately before the redemption (the same ratio 
test must also be satisfied with regard to the company’s common stock, 
voting and nonvoting), and (2 ) immediately after the redemption the 
shareholder owns less than 50 percent of the total voting power in the 
company. The code does not quantify the “not essentially equivalent” test, 
but it has proved difficult for taxpayers to meet.
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percent of his previous interest (45%/60% = 75%) and (2) less 
than 50 percent of the common equity and voting power re­
ceived for the equity in the transferred Corporation A. There­
fore, any gain realized by N as a result of the transaction 
would be treated as gain from a sale or exchange and recog­
nized to the extent of cash received. If N realizes a loss, it 
would not be recognized, since the transaction otherwise 
meets the requirements for tax deferral.
If, on the other hand, N had given up 60 percent of the 
stock of A and received 49 percent of the stock given by B in 
the transaction (49%/60% is more than 80%), the boot received 
by N would be taxable as a dividend, even though his interest 
in the acquiring corporation (Corporation B) after the trans­
action might be less than 1 percent (unless the reduction of 
N’s proportionate ownership can qualify, under the particular 
facts but without reference to N’s percentage ownership in 
the acquiring corporation, as “not essentially equivalent to a 
dividend” under section 302(b) (1) )  .45
Amount o f dividend.
Where boot is to be treated as a dividend, we believe that 
the rules for determining the amount of the dividend should 
be changed. Currently, the amount treated as a dividend to 
a shareholder upon the receipt of taxable boot is limited to 
the lesser of (1) the gain recognized in the transaction or (2) 
the shareholder’s ratable share of the accumulated earnings 
and profits of the transferred corporation.46 Thus, a share­
holder who gives up high-basis stock may have to report a 
small dividend or none at all, while a shareholder with low- 
basis stock may have a sizable dividend. This treatment is 
quite different from that of an ordinary dividend, where the 
only limitation on the taxable amount is the shareholder’s 
share of earnings and profits, and where it is immaterial 
whether his stock has appreciated or declined in value.
45. These proposed rules would not be affected by integration of individual 
and corporate income taxes. However, if integration is adopted, dividend 
treatment may become more attractive than sale or exchange treatment 
(to the shareholder under the gross-up method, or to the corporation under 
the dividends-paid deduction method). We believe that boot dividends 
should be treated the same as regular dividends for integration purposes.
46. Sec. 356(a ) (2 ).
32
We believe that regular and boot dividends should be 
measured in the same manner. Therefore, we recommend that, 
where the boot received by a shareholder in a reorganization 
is to be treated as a dividend, the amount of such dividend 
be the lesser of (1) the fair market value o f the boot received  
(rather than the recognized gain) or (2) the shareholder’s 
ratable share of accumulated earnings and profits.48 Any excess 
of the fair market value of the boot received over the amount 
taxable as a dividend would, under section 301 ( c ), be treated 
as a return of capital and, to the extent it exceeds the trans­
feror’s basis in the stock, as gain from the sale or exchange of 
the stock.49
If the boot received by a shareholder in a reorganization 
is, under our recommendations, to be treated as a dividend by 
virtue of section 304 or 306, the shareholder’s ratable share of 
accumulated earnings and profits would be calculated under 
the rules of those s e c t i o ns . 50 In any other case, the accumu­
lated earnings and profits to be used in arriving at the amount 
of the dividend should be those of the corporation whose 
stock was transferred, even though the boot came from the 
acquiring corporation. The acquiring corporation would be 
deemed to have contributed the boot property to the corpora­
tion whose stock was transferred, and the boot property would 
then be deemed to have been used by that corporation to 
make a distribution to the transferor shareholder.
47. Currently, a regular dividend in property to a noncorporate taxpayer 
is measured by its fair market value. The same dividend to a domestic 
corporation is measured by the lesser of its fair market value or adjusted 
basis in the hands of the distributing corporation [sec. 301(b) (1) (A) 
and (B )]. A hoot dividend is measured by fair market value for all recipi­
ents. We would retain this difference between regular and boot dividends 
because of the administrative convenience of using fair market value for all 
recipients of a boot dividend.
48. Currently, the amount of an ordinary dividend is limited to the corpora­
tion’s current or accumulated earnings and profits, but the amount of a 
boot dividend is limited to accumulated earnings and profits only. We 
would retain this difference.
49. Our recommendations for treatment of boot dividends will usually 
produce a higher tax liability than current law. However, if the acquired 
corporation has low or no accumulated earnings and profits, our recom­
mendations may produce a lower tax.
.50. Secs. 304(b)(2) and 306(a)(l)(A)(ii).
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Effects of Transaction: Acquiring Corporation
Recognition o f Gain or Loss. The acquiring corporation would 
recognize gain or loss only if, and to the extent that, the fair 
market value of boot given up by it differs from the acquiring 
corporation’s tax basis in the boot property. The character of the 
gain or loss to be recognized will depend upon the character the 
boot property had in the hands of the acquiring corporation.
Basis and Holding Period o f the Acquired Equity
1. General rule
The acquiring corporation’s basis in the acquired equity 
would be determined as under present law.51 It would be the 
transferor’s basis, plus any dividend taxed to him and any gain 
recognized by him in the transaction. Under section 1223(2), 
the acquiring corporation’s holding period will include the 
holding period of the transferor.
2. Optional method for determining basis
The general rule described above can produce unreason­
able results. Often, the basis of the stock is much lower than 
the tax basis of the underlying assets of the acquired corpora­
tion. If, instead of getting stock, the acquiring corporation had 
received the assets of the acquired company, it would gener­
ally have a higher aggregate basis. Sometimes, this drawback 
of a stock acquisition can be eliminated by a later liquidation 
of the acquired subsidiary under section 332. However, where 
legal or other considerations prevent liquidation of the ac­
quired company, the acquiring company will be at a disad­
vantage if it later sells the stock or if it files consolidated 
returns that result in the creation of an excess loss account.52
In order to avoid discrimination against an acquiring cor­
poration merely because it is not feasible to liquidate the 
acquired corporation, we recommend a special basis rule 
under which a corporation that acquires at least 80 percent 
of the value of another corporation’s equity (excluding, for 
this purpose, nonvoting, nonparticipating preferred stock) 
could elect to claim, as basis for the acquired stock, its ratable
51. Sec. 362(b ).
52. Regs. sec. 1.1502-14, -19 , and -32.
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share of the basis of the underlying assets less liabilities. We 
recommend an 80 percent test because we believe that the 
optional basis should be available only where enough equity 
is acquired to make the economic eff ect of the transaction 
similar to that of an acquisition of substantially all the assets.
Definitions and Special Rules
"Equity" Defined
Under our recommendations, the current law’s emphasis on 
such terms as “voting stock,” “nonvoting stock,” and “securities” 
shifts to the word “equity.” Only the equity of the transferee 
corporation, for example, could be received tax-free by the trans­
feror(s) in a business combination or incorporation. Similarly, 
our proposed rules for determining whether the transaction itself 
qualifies for tax deferral require the receipt and retention of a 
minimum amount of the transferee’s equity.
We would define equity broadly to include any interest in 
a corporation which is not, by virtue of its terms or of the cir­
cumstances, a debt of the corporation. Normally, equity would 
include—
1. Participating or nonparticipating, voting or nonvoting, con­
vertible or nonconvertible, preferred or common s t o c k , 53 and
2. Warrants and similar rights to acquire equity securities.
Numerous types of interests in a corporation have been de­
signed and, given the ingenuity of corporate advisors, many more 
can be designed that are neither clearly equity nor clearly debt. 
Included in this group are sinking fund preferred stock, converti­
ble bonds, and debt with attached privileges of acquiring an 
equity interest. In this last type of instrument, the privilege of 
acquiring an equity interest may or may not be severable from 
the debt itself. We believe that the substance of such documents 
rather than their form or title should prevail. We recommend
53. Except where the terms of the instrument are such as clearly to make 
it in substance a corporate debt (e.g., nonvoting sinking fund preferred stock 
with substantial security rights normally found only in corporate debt 
instruments).
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that the following principles be applied in characterizing an 
instrument:
1. Where a document is severable into two or more parts that 
can be disposed of separately ( for example, a bond with war­
rants attached) and severability is not delayed more than 
one-fourth of the total period during which the document 
might be expected to remain outstanding, the components of 
the document should be separately characterized.54
2. In the interests of certainty and simplicity, documents that 
include more than one right without severability ( for example, 
convertible bonds) would need to be treated as either all debt 
or all equity. We recommend an arbitrary rule that a con­
vertible bond be deemed a debt, unless the conversion privi­
lege accounts for at least one-fourth of the total value of the 
document at the time of issuance. As a practical matter, it is 
rare for a conversion privilege to account for as much as 25 
percent of the value of the convertible bond at issuance.
The distinction between equity and debt will remain important 
in the tax treatment of business combinations even if an integra­
tion method is adopted. There are three events to consider: (1) the 
receipt of equity or debt (as far as we are concerned here, the 
receipt would normally be in a transaction described in part III 
of subchapter C ), (2) the receipt of a return on equity or debt, 
that is, dividend or interest ( there is clearly an important distinc­
tion here except under the deduction method), and (3) the 
extinguishment of equity or debt by way of redemption, liquida­
tion, and so forth.
If a transferor of property or stock receives an interest in the 
transferee corporation, the character of that interest as equity or 
debt will determine how the transferor is taxed. If the transferor 
receives boot taxable as a dividend, the dividend will be larger
54. Thus, if a twenty-year bond carries warrants detachable after five years 
or less, the recipient would be treated as having received equity to the 
extent of the value of the warrants and debt to the extent of the value of 
the bond without the warrants.
This “one fourth of the time” test is an arbitrary one and some other 
test might possibly be used. Some kind of test, however, would be neces­
sary lest a document be merely disguised as severable, such as a bond with 
warrants detachable in the nineteenth year of its twenty-year life.
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under the gross-up method than under the deduction or current 
double-tax methods.
If a business combination or incorporation results in the ex­
tinguishment of an interest in a corporation, the tax effect will 
depend in part on whether the interest is debt or equity, with or 
without integration.
Attribution Rules
The present reorganization provisions and section 351 differ 
from most other tax rules for corporation-shareholder transactions 
in that they disregard (with very limited exceptions) the indirect 
or “constructive” ownership of one corporation’s equity by another. 
In order to recognize economic realities, we recommend the 
adoption of attribution-of-ownership rules in determining the tax 
treatment of incorporations and business combinations.
Attribution of ownership would be important in determining—
1. Whether stock of a parent company can be used by an acquir­
ing corporation in exchange for stock or property.
2. Whether an acquiring corporation may transfer the acquired 
properties or equity to a subsidiary corporation.
3. Whether the acquiring corporation has the required ownership 
immediately after an exchange of equity for equity ( more than 
50 percent under our recommendations).
4. Whether a transferor or transferors of less than a “business” 
has the required ownership in the transferee in order to 
qualify under section 351 (more than 50 percent under our 
recommendations).
5. Whether equity transferred to, and retained by, a subsidiary 
may be taken into account for our proposed 20 percent 
continuity-of-interest test.
We believe that in determining whether a corporation may 
use the stock of its parent in an acquisition and whether a corpo­
ration may transfer acquired equity or property to a subsidiary, 
(1) attribution should apply only within a chain of corporations 
and (2) the test should be net voting power.
We believe that net voting power, rather than value, of equity 
should be used in determining whether the attribution rules
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apply. Attribution is appropriate where the corporations are an 
economic entity; voting power appears to us to be the best indi­
cator that they are such an entity. An acquiring corporation could 
use the equity of a company that has net voting power (direct 
and/or indirect) of more than 50 percent in the acquiring corpo­
ration. Any such corporation would be a “parent” as that term is 
used in this statement. Similarly, a corporation could transfer 
acquired properties or equity to a corporation in which it holds 
more than 50 percent net voting power. Such corporation would 
be a “subsidiary.” In figure 1, the results would be these:
1. In an acquisition of assets or of another corporation’s equity, 
E could use the equity of B (60% net voting power) or of A 
(30% plus 60% of 60% = 66% net voting power). E could not 
transfer acquired property or equity to any other corporation 
because it has no subsidiary.
2. A, on the other hand, could use only its own equity for acquisi­
tions because it has no parent but could transfer acquired 
property or equity to E (66% net voting power), B (60% net 
voting power), C (60% net voting power), or F (60% net 
voting power) but not to D (60% of 100% of 60%, plus 60% of 
20% = 48% net voting power).
3. B could use equity of A and could transfer to E, C, or D 
(although A could not transfer to D).
4. C could use equity of A or B and could transfer to D.
5. D could use equity of B or C but not A and has no subsidiary 
to which it could transfer.
6. F could use equity of A but could not transfer to another 
corporation.
7. G can use only its own equity and could transfer to H.
8. H can use G equity but could not transfer to any corporation.
On the other hand, for determining whether the more-than- 
50%-in-value ownership test is met to qualify a section 351 trans­
action or a stock-for-stock acquisition, the holdings of a group 
of corporations should be aggregated. If the directly involved 
corporation (the corporation with respect to which the test is 
made) is one in a chain, the group would consist of all those 
corporations in the chain that have more than 50 percent net 
voting power in the involved corporation plus all those in which
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the involved corporation has more than 50 percent net voting 
power. It would also include all corporations outside the chain 
(sister corporations) in which any group member inside the 
chain holds more than 50 percent net voting power. For example, 
in figure 1 the results would be these:
1. A could count the holdings of E, B, C, and F  in addition to 
its own but could not count D’s holdings. (A’s net voting 
power in D is only 48 percent.)
E could add to its own holdings those of B and A as members 
of its chain, plus F ’s holdings (because of A’s voting power 
over F ), plus those of C and D (because of B’s voting power 
over C and C’s voting power over D ).
B or C could count the holdings of A, E, D, and F  in addition 
to their own respective holdings.
F could count the holdings of A, B, E, and C but not D.
D could count only the holdings of C, B, and E.
The holdings of G and H would be aggregated, but they could 
not include the holdings of any other corporation.
2.
FIGURE 1
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Percentages Refer to Voting Power
A corporation could, under these rules, be a member of more 
than one group. Referring to the immediately preceding example, 
E, for instance, can be a member of groups A, B, C, F, and E or 
of groups E, A, B, C, D, and F  or of groups D, C, B, and E.
Effect of Integration on Recommendations
Our recommendations would not be changed by the adoption 
of integration, which would affect only the tax results of those 
reorganizations in which boot is taxed as a dividend. We recom­
mend that, for integration purposes, boot dividends and regular 
dividends be treated in the same manner, consistent with our 
view that boot dividends should be characterized and measured 
under the same rules as regular dividends.
Shareholders Who Receive Boot
Under the gross-up method, the shareholder’s taxable dividend 
may exceed the value of the boot received, with a tax credit for 
the excess. That may make dividend treatment more attractive to 
some shareholders than sale or exchange treatment. Under the 
deduction method, the shareholder’s tax is not changed, but the 
corporation that is deemed to have distributed the dividend will 
obtain a tax benefit. This benefit will normally be taken into 
account in the negotiations that lead to the reorganization, so 
that indirectly the shareholder(s) may be benefitted.
Distributing Corporation
Under the gross-up method, the boot dividend does not affect 
the distributing corporation at all.
Under the deduction method, the corporation may obtain a 
sizable deduction, for a boot dividend will often be larger than 
a regular one. If the distributor corporation remains in existence, 
it can be expected to have an opportunity to use the deduction, 
especially if it can be carried back or forward in some manner. 
If the distributor corporation disappears as part of the plan of 
reorganization, it may not be able to use the deduction against 
its own current and prior years’ income. In this case, we recom­
mend that the unused portion be made available as a carryover 
to the acquiring corporation(s).
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Formation and Combination 
of Noncorporate 
Business Enterprises
We believe that the present partnership rules of subchapter K 
generally provide enough flexibility for the combination of two 
or more unincorporated businesses, whether previously conducted 
as partnerships or sole proprietorships. We recommend only two 
changes.
Continuation of Partnerships in a Partnership 
Merger
When two or more partnerships merge, the present law usually 
treats the smaller partnership(s) or, in some cases, all of them 
as terminated. This treatment can produce adverse tax results.5 
We recommend that the resulting partnership be treated as a 
continuation of all constituent partnerships. The combined part­
nership should probably be required to adopt the taxable year 
of the largest constituent partnership or proprietorship.
Carryover of Tax Attributes and Certain Credits
We believe that any tax characteristics associated with a 
transferred business,56 whether that business was previously con­
ducted as a partnership or as a sole proprietorship, should be 
carried over to the continuing partnership, just as the tax attri­
butes of a transferred corporate business would be carried over 
under our foregoing recommendations.57
55. For example, the use of accelerated methods of depreciation is generally 
available only to the original user of the property. The distributee partners 
may not use accelerated depreciation with respect to property distributed 
to them nor may a successor partnership [reg. secs. 1 .1 6 7 (c )-1 (a)(6) and 
1.708-1 (b)(2)].
56. As distinguished from the tax characteristics associated with the former 
owners of the transferred business or with other property of the transferors.
57. See “Carryover of Tax Attributes,” above.
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APPENDIX
Current Taxation of the 
Formation and Combination 
of Corporate Businesses
A general rule of taxation is that any exchange is a taxable event 
unless exempted by a special provision.1 The code provisions that per­
mit nontaxable incorporations and reorganizations are among these ex­
ceptions. To achieve non taxability, a transaction must comply with the 
precise requirements of the code and  with their intent, otherwise it re­
mains taxable. If a transaction fails to achieve nontaxability, some or 
all of the parties will have to recognize gain or loss in the year it is 
carried out, even though it might appear that there was only a slight 
change in the taxpayer’s economic situation.2
In a reorganization or incorporation, it is not always to the tax­
payer’s advantage to have a nontaxable transaction. Such a transaction 
does not exempt the realized gain from taxation; it merely defers it to 
an indefinite future time when it is realized in a taxable transaction. In
NOTE: The sole purpose of the Appendix is to provide background information 
as an aid to understanding the proposals of this Tax Policy Statement. Although 
it may suggest lines of research, such research should be pursued in other ap­
propriate sources.
1. The federal income tax treatment of gains and losses from property dispositions 
is controlled by a number of statutory provisions. Gains derived from a taxpayer’s 
dealings in property are included in the taxpayer’s income under sec. 6 1 (a )  
( 3 ) ,  while losses sustained in such transactions are, with certain limitations, de­
ductible. The mere appreciation or depreciation in the value of property does not 
generally constitute a presently taxable event. When property is disposed of 
through sale, exchange, destruction, etc., the amount of the taxpayer’s realized  
gain or loss is determined by the difference between the value of what he receives 
in the transaction for the property and its adjusted basis. Sec. 1 0 0 1 (c ) requires 
him to recognize this gain or loss unless some other provision in the statute pro­
vides otherwise.
2. See, for example, U.S. v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1 9 2 1 ), 1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶54; 
Rockefeller v. U.S., 257 U.S. 176 (1 9 2 1 ), 1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶55; and Marr v. U.S., 
268 U.S. 536 (1 9 2 5 ) , 1 U.S. Tax Gas. ¶137.
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the meantime, the unrecognized gain is preserved in a lower basis for 
the property received by the taxpayer, that is, lower than its fair market 
value. Deferral permits taxpayers to consummate exchanges in which 
an investment is merely changed into another form and in which they 
do not receive funds with which to pay the often very large tax liability 
that would arise if the transaction were taxable. On the other hand, in 
a nontaxable transaction loss is also deferred (in the form of a basis 
higher than fair market value). If the exchange involves appreciated 
property, not only will the transferor have low-basis-high-value prop­
erty after the exchange, but the transferee will also have low-basis- 
high-value property because the property it receives will keep the low 
basis it had in the transferor’s hands. Therefore, the government may 
eventually collect two taxes on the same appreciation.
Transfers to Controlled Corporations
The purchase of a new or existing corporation’s stock or securities 
for cash ordinarily results in no immediate tax consequences to the ac­
quiring taxpayer. Often, however, corporate stock or securities are ac­
quired with property other than cash. A proprietorship or a partnership 
may decide to incorporate a going business. A taxpayer or group of tax­
payers may contribute property to create a new business in corporate 
form or to enlarge an existing corporation. Because property, rather 
than cash, is given in exchange for the stock or securities of the cor­
porate transferee, and because the value of the stock or securities usually 
differs from the transferor’s basis in the contributed property, gain or 
loss is realized by the transferor as a result of the exchange. Section 351 
provides for an indefinite postponement, but not elimination, of the 
taxable recognition of the gain or the loss arising from transactions that 
satisfy its requirements.
Background and Purpose of Section 351
The earliest predecessor of the present-day section 351 was section 
202(e)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1921. The express purpose of this 
provision was to “eliminate . . . technical constructions which were 
economically unsound,” and thereby to facilitate required business ad­
justments.3 Prior to 1921, for instance, the creation of even a one-man
3. H. Rept. 350 and S. Rept. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., 1921; reprinted in J. S. 
Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income and Excess Profits Tax Laws, 
1861—1938  (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1938), pp. 790-791.
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corporation through the transfer of appreciated or depreciated property 
to the new corporation for all of its capital stock gave rise to a taxable 
gain or a deductible loss.
- The basic premise of the 1921 forerunner of section 351 was de­
scribed by the court in Portland Oil Company v. Comm.:
It is the purpose of [section 351] to save the taxpayer from an imme­
diate recognition of a gain, or to intermit the claim of a loss, in certain 
transactions where a gain or loss may have accrued in a constitutional 
sense, but where in a popular or economic sense there has been a mere 
change in the form of ownership and the taxpayer has not really “cashed 
in” on a theoretical gain, or closed out a losing venture.4
In another early decision, the court stated:
[A transaction qualifying under section 351] effects a change in form, 
but not in substance, of the beneficial interests of the transferors in the 
transferred property. The transaction . . . lacks a distinguishing charac­
teristic of a sale, in that, instead of having the effect of terminating or 
extinguishing the beneficial interests of the transferors in the transferred 
property after . . . the transaction the transferors continue to be bene­
ficially interested in the transferred property and have dominion over 
it by virtue of their control of the new corporate owner. . .5
With relatively few substantive changes and only minor differences 
in language, a provision similar to the one originally adopted in the 
1921 act has, without interruption, been a part of the tax law for the 
past fifty-eight years.
Basic Statutory Scheme
Under the general rule of section 351(a), no gain or loss is recog­
nized if property is transferred to a corporation by one or more persons 
solely in exchange for stock or securities of the transferee corporation 
and if, “immediately after the exchange,” the transferor or transferors 
are “in control” of the corporation. The property may be transferred to 
create a new corporation or to enlarge an existing corporation. In either 
case the transferors, to be “in control” of the corporation, must collec­
tively own (1) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power 
of all classes of stock entitled to vote, and (2) at least 80 percent of the 
total number of shares of all other classes of the transferee corporation’s
4. 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1 940), 4 0 -1  U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9234.
5. American Compress and Warehouse Co. v. Bender, 70  F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1934), 
4 U.S. Tax Cas. P 2 8 3 .
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stock.6 The transferee corporation recognizes neither a gain nor a loss 
upon the issuance of its stock or securities in exchange for money or 
other property.7
Transferors Must Collectively M eet the Control R equirem ent
W hen only one person transfers property to the corporation, that 
person must be in control of the transferee immediately after the ex­
change for the transfer to qualify under section 351. If two or more 
transferors participate in the same transaction, however, the tax law 
looks to the stock ownership of the group  of transferors to determine 
whether the required post-transaction control exists.8 In either case, 
both the stock acquired in the transfer itself and  any stock already 
owned by the transferor(s) before the exchange is taken into account 
in computing control.9
Under section 351, stock or securities issued for the performance of 
services are not considered as having been issued for “property.” Since 
only the stock ownership of the transferors who exchange property for 
the stock or securities of the transferee is taken into account in de­
termining whether the control requirement has been satisfied, any per­
son who transfers only services is not considered a part of the group of 
transferors in applying this test.10
6. Section 3 6 8 (c ) .  Prior to 1954, gain or loss realized in an exchange involving 
two or more transferors would go unrecognized only if “the amount of stock and 
securities received by each [transferor was] substantially in proportion to his 
interest in the property prior to the exchange.” Violation of this requirement would 
lead to the full recognition of gain or loss by all parties to the exchange. This 
requirement was eliminated in 1954. Under current law, section 351 is to be 
applied regardless of any disproportionate share of stock or securities received by 
a transferor in the exchange. If there is a disproportionate distribution in a section 
351 exchange, “the transaction may be treated as if the stock or securities had 
first been received in proportion [to the value of the property transferred], and 
then some of such stock and securities had been used to make gifts, to pay com­
pensation, or to satisfy obligations of the transferor . . .” [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 (b )(1 )].
7. Sec. 1 0 3 2 (a ).
8. It is not necessary for each transferor to convey property to the transferee corpo­
ration at the same time in order for there to be a group of transferors. A group 
of transferors includes those parties whose respective rights and obligations are 
defined prior to the transaction and whose transfers are made within a reasonable 
time of each other pursuant to one plan [reg. sec. 1 .351-1  (a )  ( 1 ) ] .
9. Reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 (a )  ( 1 ) .  The regulations provide that an existing shareholder 
shall not be treated as a part of the group of transferors if the amount of property 
transferred by him is of relatively small value in comparison to the value of stock 
he already owns and if the primary purpose of the transfer is to enable the ex­
changes of the other transferor(s) to qualify for tax-free treatment under section 
351 [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 (a )  ( 1 )  ( i i)] .
10. Where a particular transferor receives stock or securities in exchange for both 
property and services, the entire amount of the stock owned by such transferor
48
One of the most troublesome questions in section 351 transactions 
is whether control of the transferee corporation exists “immediately 
after” the exchange in those cases where the transferors subsequently 
lose c o n t r o l . 1 The statutory requirement that the transferors must be 
in control of the corporation “immediately after the exchange” at first 
glance appears to focus upon a particular point in time, to the exclu­
sion of any requirement that the control must persist. It is generally 
recognized that momentary control is not enough if the transferors 
agreed before the exchange to transfer enough of their stock to lose 
control of the transferee or if such a transfer was an integral part of the 
plan under which the exchange was made.12
R eceipt of Boot
If the transferors as a group  have satisfied the control requirement, 
the next question is whether the gain realized by a particular transferor 
is to be nontaxable—that is, did the transferor receive “solely stock or 
securities” of the transferee corporation in exchange for property?13 
W here a transferor receives cash or other property in addition to stock 
or securities of the transferee, section 3 5 1 (b ) requires that any gain, 
but not loss, realized by such transferor be recognized to the extent of 
the “boot” ( that is, amount of cash plus the fair market value of other
after the transaction is counted in determining whether the group of property 
transferors has control of the corporation. If a relatively small amount of property 
is transferred merely as a device for enabling the parties who actually transfer 
property to qualify under section 351, this rule does not apply. The value of stock 
received for services is taxable as ordinary income even if section 351 does apply 
[reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -1 (a )  (1 )  (ii) and (a )  (2 )  example ( 3 ) ] .
11. Under section 3 5 1 (c ) ,  the fact that a corporate transferor immediately dis­
tributes the stock it receives in a sec. 351 exchange to its shareholders is ignored 
in determining whether the transferors are in control “immediately after” the 
exchange.
12. See Boris Bittker and James Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corpora­
tions and Shareholders, 3d ed. (Boston: Warren, Gorham and Lamont, 1971, pp. 
3 -3 2 — 3-38 .
13. The term stock refers to an equity interest in a corporation. For purposes of 
sec. 351, the stock can be common or preferred, voting or nonvoting. Stock rights 
and stock warrants, however, are excluded from the definition of stock by reg. sec. 
1.351-1 (a )  ( 1 ) .  The term security refers to an evidence of indebtedness of the 
corporation, but not all corporate obligations are securities within the meaning 
of sec. 351. Although it has been said that an “overall evaluation of the nature 
of [a] debt” is required to distinguish between a corporate obligation that is a 
security and one that is not (Cam p W olters Enterprises, Inc., 22 T.C. 737 (1 9 5 4 ),  
aff’d 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1956) 56-1  U.S. Tax Gas. 1(9314), the length of 
time to maturity is by far the most important consideration. Corporate notes, 
bonds, debentures, etc., that fall due within five years or less will rarely qualify as 
securities, while obligations with maturities of ten years or more probably will. 
The status of obligations with terms of between five and ten years is less certain. 
Other factors, such as listing on an exchange, can also be important.
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property) r e c e i v e d .14 Because stock or securities issued for services are 
not treated as having been issued for property, they cannot be received 
tax free in a transaction that otherwise qualifies under section 351. The 
person who has rendered or will render such services must recognize 
ordinary income to the extent of the fair market value of the stock or 
securities received for the services.15
Corporate Assumption of Transferor Liabilities
The relief from a liability ( or the disposition of property subject to 
a liability) is generally treated as the equivalent of cash received. Sec­
tion 3 5 7 (a ) , however, provides an exception to this rule. If, in a section 
351 exchange, the transferee corporation assumes a liability of the trans­
feror or takes property subject to a liability, this direct or indirect re­
lief from the debt is not generally treated as “other property or money” 
( i.e., boot) received by the transferor.16 There are two exceptions to this 
rule:
1. If, taking into account the nature of the liability and the circum ­
stances under which the assumption or acquisition was made, the
14. For example, X  transfers property having an adjusted basis of $20,000 and a 
fair market value of $25,000 to Z Corporation in exchange for 250 shares of the 
corporation’s stock (valued at $100 per share). In the same transaction Y transfers 
property having an adjusted basis of $50,000 and a fair market value of $85,000  
in exchange for 800 shares of Z Corporation stock and $5,000 in cash. Together, 
X  and Y own 100 percent of Z Corporation’s outstanding stock and therefore 
satisfy the control requirement of section 351. Since X  received no boot, no part 
of his realized gain of $5,000 is recognized. Y’s realized gain of $35,000 must be 
recognized to the extent of the boot ($5 ,000 in cash) he received. Had Y instead 
received $40,000 in cash and only 450 shares of stock, his recognized gain would 
have been limited to his realized gain of $35,000.
In determining the character of the recognized gain, reference must generally 
be made to the character of the transferred assets. According to the regulations, a 
distribution by a corporation of its stock or securities “in connection with an 
exchange subject to Section 3 5 1 (a )” may, in some cases, have “the effect of the 
distribution of a taxable dividend” [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 1 -2 (d )] . For example, a dividend 
could result when property is transferred to an existing corporation in exchange 
for stock, securities, or boot having greater value [reg. sec. 1.301—1 (j ) ] .
15. See n. 10, supra.
16. Prior to 1938, this treatment—although it had not yet received statutory 
sanction—was widely accepted as consistent with the spirit of sec. 351 and certain 
analogous reorganization provisions. However, in U.S. v. H end ler, 303 U.S. 564 
(1 9 3 8 ), 3 8 -1  U.S. Tax Gas. ¶1215, the Supreme Court ruled that the assumption 
and payment of the transferor’s liabilities by the transferee corporation were tanta­
mount to the receipt of money and, therefore, constituted taxable boot to the 
transferor. Congress, primarily concerned with the adverse effect that the H endler 
decision might have upon the usefulness of sec. 351 and certain reorganization 
provisions, reacted to the decision by enacting the provisions now embodied, 
with minor changes, in sec. 3 5 7 (a )  and (b ) .
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transferor’s principal purpose for such an arrangement was the avoid­
ance of federal income tax on the transaction or was not a bona fide 
business purpose, all liabilities will be treated as “boot” even if only 
one of them is so “tainted.”17
2. If, with respect to a particular transferor, the total liabilities as­
sumed by the transferee plus the total liabilities to which the trans­
ferred property is subject exceed the transferor’s aggregate basis in 
the properties transferred, the transferor must recognize gain to the 
extent of such excess.18
Basis and Holding Period of Property 
Received in a Section 351 Exchange
The purpose of section 351 (and certain analogous reorganization 
provisions) is to permit the postponement, rather than the elimination, 
of the gain or loss realized but not recognized at the time of the ex­
change. This deferral is accomplished by preserving such gain or loss 
in the bases of the assets acquired by both the transferor and the trans­
feree in the exchange. If the exchange does not involve boot or an as­
sumption of, or transfer subject to, liabilities, the transferor’s basis in 
the property transferred “carries over” to become ( 1 )  the transferor/ 
shareholder’s basis in his newly acquired stock or securities and (2 )  
the transferee corporation’s basis in the property it receives in the ex-
17. Sec. 35 7 (b )(1 ). This exception is directed primarily against transferors who 
borrow money immediately before a sec. 351 exchange with the intention of keep­
ing the loan proceeds and then shifting the responsibility for repayment to the 
transferee corporation. When an existing proprietorship or partnership with 
liabilities created in the ordinary course of business is incorporated, the trans- 
feror(s) should have little difficulty proving a proper business purpose for their 
transfer. Section 3 5 7 (b ) is much more likely to apply when the transferred lia­
bility was created shortly before the exchange. Note that in any suit or proceeding 
in which the applicability of sec. 3 5 7 (b ) is at issue, the transferor of such lia­
bility or liabilities must, under the statute, prove a proper business purpose by a 
“clear preponderance of the evidence” [sec. 3 5 7 (b )(2 )].
18. Sec. 3 5 7 (c ) .  Assume, for example, that a transferor transfers to a corporation
( 1 )  a building having an adjusted basis of $20,000 and a fair market value of 
$60,000, subject to a mortgage of $50,000, and ( 2 )  land having an adjusted basis 
of $15,000 and a fair market value of $25,000. In the exchange, which qualifies 
under section 351, he receives ( 1 )  stock of the transferee valued at $35,000 and
( 2 )  the transferee's assumption of the $50,000 mortgage. His realized gain under 
Section 1001 is $50,000 (value of stock received plus liability relieved less his 
bases in the land and the building), of which $15,000 (mortgage less bases of 
the land and the building) is presently recognized and taxed under sec. 3 5 7 (c ) .  
The recognition of the remaining $35,000 gain is postponed under sec. 3 5 1 (a )  
until such time as the transferor disposes of the stock in a taxable transaction.
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change.19 W hen boot is received or liabilities are assumed, adjustments 
to the transferor’s basis are required.
Transferors Basis in Stock, Securities, and Boot Received
The transferor’s basis in the stock or securities ( “nonrecognition 
property” ) received is his basis in the property transferred minus the 
amount of money and the market value of any “other property” (boot) 
received, minus any liability assumed by the corporation or to which 
the transferred property was subject (unless the liabilities were in­
cluded in the boot), plus any gain recognized, and plus any dividend 
taxed to him. His basis in the other property (or boot) is that property’s 
market value on the date of the transaction.20
W hen the transferor disposes of the stock or securities received un­
der section 3 5 1 (a ) , he determines his holding period by including the 
period during which he held the property transferred, provided the 
transferred property was either a capital asset or depreciable or real 
property used in the transferor’s trade or business and held for more 
than one year at the time of the transfer (that is, section 1231 prop­
erty ) .21 The transferor’s holding period for stock or securities received 
for any other assets, as well as his holding period for any boot received 
in the exchange, begins on the date of the exchange.
Transferee Corporations Basis in Property Received
The transferee corporation’s basis in the property received in a sec­
tion 351 exchange is the transferor’s basis, plus the gain recognized by, 
and any dividend taxed to, the transferor on the exchange.22 Thus, 
where the exchange is tax free to the transferor, the corporation “steps 
into the shoes” of the transferor, with each asset retaining in the hands 
of the corporation the same basis it had in the hands of the trans­
feror immediately before the exchange.23 The corporation’s holding
19. Secs. 358 and 362. For example, X, in an exchange qualifying under sec. 351, 
transfers property having an adjusted basis of $30,000 and a fair market value of 
$50,000 to Z Corporation in exchange for 500 shares of its stock (valued at $100  
a share). X ’s basis in the stock he acquires is $30,000. Z Corporation’s basis in 
the property is also $30,000. X ’s realized gain of $20,000 is not recognized at the 
time of the transaction, but if he later sells this stock for $50,000, his taxable 
gain at that time would be $20,000. If the transferor receives more than one 
item that can be received tax free (e.g., common and preferred stock), his basis 
is allocated among them in the ratio of their values [reg. sec. 1 .3 5 8 -2 (b ) ( 2 ) ] .
20. Sec. 3 5 8 (a )  and (d ) .
21. Sec. 1 2 2 3 (1 ) .
22. Sec. 3 6 2 (a ) .
23. Note that the depreciation recapture potential of any sec. 1245 or sec. 1250
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period includes the period during which the property was held by the 
transferee.24
"Acquisition-Type'' Corporate Reorganizations
Exchanges of property in connection with corporate combinations, 
acquisitions, separations, and structural readjustments can be fully tax­
able or wholly or partly nontaxable. If the transaction is to be non- 
taxable to the corporations involved and their respective shareholders, it 
must satisfy the very technical requirements of the statute and meet 
certain judicially developed, nonstatutory criteria (for example, “c on­
tinuity of interest” and “business purpose” tests).
F or income tax purposes, section 3 6 8 ( a ) ( 1 )  defines the term re­
organization to include only the following transactions:
(A ) a statutory m erger or consolidation;
(B )  the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a 
p art of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a part of 
the voting stock of a corporation which is in control of the acquir­
ing corporation), of stock of another corporation if, imm ediately  
after the acquisition, the acquiring corporation has control of such  
other corporation (w hether or not such acquiring corporation had  
control immediately before the acquisition);
(C )  the acquisition by one corporation, in exchange solely for all or a 
part of its voting stock (or in exchange solely for all or a p art of 
the voting stock of a corporation w hich is in control of the acquir­
ing corporation), of substantially all of the properties of another 
corporation, but in determining w hether the exchange is solely 
for stock the assumption by the acquiring corporation of a liability 
of the other, or the fact that property acquired is subject to a 
liability, shall be disregarded;
(D ) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another 
corporation if imm ediately after the transfer the transferor, or one 
or m ore of its shareholders (including persons who were share­
holders imm ediately before the tran sfer), or any combination  
thereof, is in control of the corporation to which the assets are 
transferred; but only if, in pursuance of the plan, stock or securities 
of the corporation to which the assets are transferred are dis­
tributed in a transaction which qualifies under section 3 5 4 , 35 5 , 
or 3 5 6 ;
( E )  a recapitalization; or
( F )  a m ere change in identity, form, or place of organization, however 
effected.
property received by the transferee corporation, which is attributable to deprecia­
tion taken by the transferor on such property prior to the exchange, is “carried 
over” with the property.
24. Sec. 1 2 2 3 (2 ).
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These six types of reorganizations are commonly designated by the sub- 
paragraph letter identifying each: type A, type B, type C, type D, type 
E , and type F .
In general, types A and C are “fusion,” or acquisition-type, trans­
actions used to combine the assets of two or more corporations ( whether 
previously independent or affiliated); type B is also an acquisitive re­
organization and is used to acquire a subsidiary. A type D reorganiza­
tion, on the other hand, may be used to combine two affiliated corpora­
tions, to “reincorporate,” or to effect a corporate separation; and types 
E  and F  are changes in the structure of a single corporation.
History of the Reorganization Concept
The 1913 law contained no exception to the rule that every disposi­
tion of property is a taxable event. In the early cases, the courts fol­
lowed the strict letter of the law and applied this rule even to purely 
paper transactions. Later Congress decided that certain transactions 
should not be taxed because they were nothing more than readjust­
ments in a corporate business enterprise or the substitution of one item 
for another that was actually the same thing in different guise. Thus 
began a lengthy process of evolution to establish the degree of con­
tinuity of interest, form, or substance necessary to justify postponement 
of tax on the theory that the exchange was actually only one phase of 
a continuing transaction. During this evolutionary process, the courts 
followed Congress but added their own requirements for sound busi­
ness purpose, corporate purpose, net economic effect, and reality of 
transactions.
The First Reorganization Legislation
The Revenue Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 made no specific refer­
ence to exchanges of property other than to stipulate that the term  
incom e included gains and profits derived from “sales” or “dealings” in 
property. Consequently, no definition of reorganization was to be found 
in these early laws, and such transactions were automatically taxable.25
25. From 1921 to 1925, the U.S. Supreme Court decided a number of important 
reorganization cases—all of which were subject to the pre-1918 rules. Even though 
the transactions made only a change in form and not in the underlying economic 
relationships of the parties, all but one of these cases held the transactions taxable. 
For a brief analysis of these decisions, see Robert S. Holzman, Corporate Reorga­
nizations: Their Federal Tax Status (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 
1955), pp. 2 -6  through 2 -10 .
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It was not until 1918 that, because of economic changes and increased 
corporate tax rates brought on by the war, Congress deemed it neces­
sary to provide for the treatm ent of reorganizations.
The Revenue Act of 1918 provided the first express rules for the tax 
treatment of “exchanges” of property. One provision exempted from 
recognition of present gain or loss the exchange of stock or securities 
for new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or face value in 
connection with a reorganization, merger, or consolidation.26 The ac­
tual meaning of “reorganization,” however, was not defined in the statute 
itself and thus had to be drawn from context or from the ordinary 
usage. Although the Treasury Department attempted to fill the defini­
tional void,27 the Revenue Act of 1918 was of little use to taxpayers 
because of the uncertainty about the meaning of its terms and because 
of the vast importance given to par values, which have little, if any, re­
lation to true value.
Yet postwar readjustments made the need for definite reorganiza­
tion provisions more important than ever, and Congress was urged to 
correct the 1918 statute so as to “permit business to go forward with the 
readjustments required by existing conditions.”28 As a result, Congress 
enacted the first comprehensive attem pt to deal with the problem of
26. Sec. 2 0 2 (b ) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that “when property is 
exchanged for other property, the property received in exchange shall, for the 
purpose of determining gain or loss, be treated as the equivalent of cash to the 
amount of its fair market value, if any; but when, in connection with the re­
organization, merger, or consolidation, a person receives in place of stock or 
securities owned by him new stock or securities of no greater aggregate par or 
face value, no gain or loss shall be deemed to occur from the exchange, and the 
new stock or securities received shall be treated as taking the place of the stock, 
or securities, or property exchanged. When, in the case of any such reorganization, 
merger, or consolidation, the aggregate par or face value of the new stock or 
securities received is in excess of the aggregate par or face value of the stock 
or securities exchanged, a like amount in par or face value of the new stock or 
securities shall be treated as taking the place of the stock or securities exchanged, 
and the amount of the excess in par or face value shall be treated as a gain to 
the extent that the fair market value of the new stock or securities is greater than 
the cost the stock or securities exchanged.”
27. In T.D. 2870 (1919, unpublished), the following intercorporate transactions 
were interpreted as falling within the scope of a “reorganization” : “In general, 
where two ( or more) corporations unite their properties by either ( a ) the dissolu­
tion of corporation B and the sale of its assets to corporation A, or (b ) the sale 
of its property by B to A and the dissolution of B, or ( c )  the sale of stock of 
B to A and the dissolution of B, or ( d ) the merger of B into A, or ( e ) the con­
solidation of the corporations, no taxable income is received from the transaction 
by A or B or the stockholders of either, provided the sole consideration received 
by B and its stockholders in (a ) ,  (b ) , ( c ) ,  and (d ) is stock and securities of 
A, and by A and B and their stockholders in (e )  is stock or securities of the 
consolidated corporation, in any case of no greater aggregate par or face value 
than the old stock or securities surrendered.”
28. See n. 3, supra.
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corporate reorganizations. Section 2 0 2 ( c ) ( 2 )  of the Revenue Act of 
1921 provided the following:
. . .  no gain or loss shall be recognized when in the reorganization of one 
or more corporations a person receives in place of any stock or securities 
owned by him, stock or securities in a corporation a party to or resulting 
from such reorganization. The word “reorganization,” as used in this 
paragraph, includes a m erger or consolidation (including the acquisi­
tion by one corporation of at least a majority of the voting stock and at 
least a majority of the total num ber of shares of all other classes of 
stock of another corporation, or of substantially all the properties of 
another corporation), recapitalization, or m ere change in identity, form, 
or place of organization (how ever effected).
Not only did this provision for the first time define reorganization, 
it also broadened the exemption provided in the 1918 Revenue Act, 
and it abandoned the par value idea. Unfortunately, the act also opened 
avenues for numerous tax avoidance schemes. Under the statutory def­
inition of a reorganization, for example, a purchase by one corporation 
of a majority of the shares of all classes of stock of another corporation 
(or of substantially all the properties of another corporation) was a re­
organization, even where the consideration for such stock (or prop­
erties) was cash. Although other provisions in the revenue act pre­
cluded the nonrecognition of gain if the sale was for cash, short-term  
notes could be used and would be considered "securities” for the pur­
pose of satisfying the conditions for nonrecognition. Consequently, un­
til the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1934 and the subsequent de­
velopment of the “continuity of interest” doctrine, short-term notes 
were often given in sales transactions.
Development of a Realistic Concept
Under the Revenue Act of 1924, the statutory definition of a re­
organization was refined and began to resemble the current statutory 
definition. Section 2 0 3 (h ) of the act provided the following:
( 1 )  The term  “reorganization” means (A ) a m erger or consolidation  
(including the acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority 
of the voting stock and at least a majority of the total num ber of 
shares of all other classes of stock of another corporation, or sub­
stantially all the properties of another corporation), or (B )  a 
transfer by a corporation of all or a p art of its assets to another 
corporation if imm ediately after the transfer the transferor or its 
stockholders, or both, are in control of the corporation to which  
the assets w ere transferred, or (C )  a recapitalization, or (D ) a 
mere change in identity, form or place of organization, however 
effected.
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(2 )  The term “a party to a reorganization” includes a corporation re­
sulting from a reorganization and includes both corporations in the 
case of an acquisition by one corporation of at least a majority of 
the voting stock and at least a majority of the total number of shares 
of all other classes of another corporation.
Control was defined to mean “the ownership of at least 80 per centum  
of the voting stock and at least 80 per centum of the total number of 
shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation.”29
This modification of the reorganization provisions was part of an 
overall plan formulated by then Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. 
Mellon. The plan, referred to as the “Mellon plan,” provided for a 
general reduction of income taxes and a complete revision of the tax 
law to place it on a sounder basis with respect to the prevailing busi­
ness and economic environment. Economic disruption of business was 
viewed as avoidable only if “taxes were put on a reasonable basis that 
(w ould) permit business to go on and industry develop.”30 This “non- 
disruptive,” or “neutrality,” concept of tax policy continues to provide 
the theoretical cornerstone upon which subsequent reorganization pro­
visions rest.
It was not until 1934, after several tax avoidance schemes using the 
mechanisms of the reorganization provisions had developed, that the 
statute was again modified. The Revenue Act of 1934 was directed at 
preventing three major categories of abuse: the tax-free sale of assets 
framed as a reorganization, the tax-free distribution of corporate earn­
ings and profits, and the strategic transfer of favorable basis from one 
asset to another just prior to sale.31 Under the 1934 act, a “reorganiza­
tion” included the following:
(A ) a statutory m erger or consolidation, or (B )  the acquisition by one 
corporation in exchange solely for all or part of its voting stock, of at 
least 8 0  per centum of the voting stock and at least 8 0  per centum  of 
the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of another 
corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another corporation, 
or (C )  a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to 
another corporation if imm ediately after the transfer the transferor or 
its stockholders or both are in control of the corporation to which the 
assets are transferred, or (D ) a recapitalization, or ( E )  a mere change  
in identity, form, or place of organization, how ever effected.32
29. Revenue Act of 1924, sec. 2 0 3 (i) .
30. Sheldon S. Cohen, “Conglomerate Mergers and Taxation,” American Bar Asso­
ciation Journal 55 ( January 1 9 6 9 ): 41.
31. Milton Sandburg, “The Income Tax Subsidy to Reorganizations,” Columbia 
Law Review 38 (1 9 3 8 ) : 116.
32. Revenue Act of 1934, sec. 1 1 2 (g ).
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The important differences between the pre-1934 and the 1934 defini­
tions of tax-free reorganization can be summarized as follows:
The addition of the word “statutory” as a qualification of “merger 
or consolidation,” which restricts the types of transactions falling 
within the definition of a tax-free reorganization.
The elimination of the parenthetical inclusion of an acquisition as 
a merger or consolidation.
The recognition of an acquisition of shares or assets as distinguished 
from a merger or consolidation by the word “or.”
4. The limitation of “acquisition” by the words “in exchange solely for 
all or a part of its voting stock.”
While these statutory changes did not eliminate the abuses, they com ­
bined with the developing body of judicial precedent to narrow sub­
stantially the scope of imagined and actual tax avoidance opportunities 
available through the use of corporate reorganizations.
1.
2.
3.
Early Case Law and the Development of 
Judicial Limitations
Faced  with the rudimentary provisions of the early reorganization 
statutes, the courts reacted to protect the spirit of the legislation by 
segregating sales and disguised dividends from true reorganizations. 
These protective instincts of the courts, over the years, resulted in the 
formulation of additional, extrastatutory criteria for evaluating the 
validity of reorganization transactions. They are usually referred to as 
the “continuity of interest,” “sound business purpose,” “corporate busi­
ness purpose,” and “step transaction” doctrines. While the statutes that 
evoked these protective remedies have been revised many times over 
the intervening years, these court-made rules continue to control the 
application of the present-day statute.
The "Continuity of Interest" Doctrine
Although the Revenue Act of 1924 removed some of the more ob­
vious loopholes of the 1921 act, the lack of controls with respect to 
consideration remained. As a result, the courts created and developed 
the important “continuity of interest” test to close loopholes in the stat­
utory formula. In Cortland Specialty Co. v. Commissioner, it was held 
that promissory notes payable in 14 months did not qualify as “securi­
ties.” The court said—
58
In defining “reorganization,” the Revenue A ct gives the widest room  
for all kinds of changes of corporate structure, but does not abandon the 
prim ary requisite that there must be some continuity of interest on the 
part of the transferor corporation or its stockholders in order to secure 
exemption. Reorganization presupposes continuance of business under 
modified corporate forms.3
The court arrived at a similar result in Pinellas Ice and Cold Stor­
age Co. V. Com m .34 In December 1926, Pinellas transferred 99 percent 
of its net assets to the Florida Company in exchange for $400,000 in 
cash and $1 million in collateral notes due on April 1, 1927. Pinellas 
distributed the cash and, as the notes were paid off, the note proceeds 
to its shareholders. The company was then dissolved. The court held 
this transaction to be a taxable sale and not a reorganization:
The mere purchase for money of the assets of one com pany by another 
is beyond the evident purpose of the provision, and has no real sem­
blance to a m erger or consolidation. Certainly, we think that to be 
within the exemption the seller m ust acquire an interest in the affairs 
of the purchasing com pany more definite than that incident to owner­
ship of its short term  purchase m oney notes.
Thus, under Pinellas, an exchange in order to be nontaxable cannot re­
semble a sale. Consideration that will soon be translated into cash by 
mere operation of time is, in effect, cash, and this circumstance removes 
the exchange  element required for a nontaxable reorganization.
The continuity-of-interest doctrine was further expanded in LeTulle  
v. Scofield, where a corporation transferred all its assets to another cor­
poration for cash and the bonds of the transferee corporation.35 In hold­
ing the transaction not to be a tax-free reorganization, the Supreme 
Court stated the following:
W here the consideration is wholly in the transferee’s bonds, or part 
cash and part such bonds, we think it cannot be said that the transferor 
retains any proprietary interest in the enterprise. On the contrary, he 
becomes a creditor of the transferee; and we do not think that the fact 
referred to by the Circuit Court of Appeals, that the bonds were secured  
solely by the assets transferred and that, upon default, the bondholder 
would retake only the property sold, change his status from that of a 
creditor to one having a proprietary stake within the purview of the 
statute. . . .
33. Cortland Specialty Co. v. Comm., 60 F.2d  937 (2d  Cir. 1932), 3 U.S. Tax Cas. 
¶980.
34. Pinellas Ice and Cold Storage Co. v. Comm., 287 U.S. 462 (1 9 3 3 ) , 3 U.S. 
Tax Cas. ¶ 023.
35. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415 (1 9 4 0 ), 4 0 -1  U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9150.
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The "Sound Business Purpose" Doctrine
Since the inception of the earliest reorganization provisions, the 
nontaxable status of these transactions has been justified, at least in 
part, on the theory that a business should be permitted, without ad­
verse tax effects, to make necessary and desirable changes that might 
improve the existing form or structure of the enterprise or better enable 
the business to meet the changing demands of its operating environ­
ment. The public-at-large was also deemed to benefit in that such ad­
justments could lead to more efficient operation of existing enterprises, 
the elimination of unprofitable ventures, or the infusion of new capital 
into sagging companies.
In the landmark decision of Gregory  v. H elvering, the Supreme 
Court established the principle that taxpayers will be denied the tax 
benefits of the reorganization provisions unless they can show, in addi­
tion to meticulous compliance with the statute, that the transaction 
serves a legitimate and genuine business purpose.36 Mrs. Gregory owned 
all the shares of Old Corporation, which, in addition to its operating 
assets, held appreciated stock in X  Corporation. Gregory wanted to ob­
tain the X  stock, sell it, and keep the proceeds with minimum tax con­
sequences. A direct distribution, whether of the stock itself or of the 
proceeds from its sale, would have produced ordinary dividend income 
equal to the value of X  stock, as would a redemption of the Old stock 
using the X  stock as payment. A complete liquidation of the Old Cor­
poration would have yielded the desired tax result, but apparently the 
parties did not wish to take such a drastic step.
In view of the shortcomings of these alternatives, the taxpayer and 
her advisers came up with the following approach. New Corporation 
was formed for the purpose of receiving the X  stock from Old Corpora­
tion, and in return for the X  stock, New Corporation issued its New 
shares to Gregory as the owner of the Old stock. Three days later, New 
Corporation was dissolved, and Gregory received as a liquidating div­
idend the X  stock, which she sold. Gregory computed her tax, using 
preferential capital gain rates, on the difference between the value of 
the X  shares and the portion of the cost of the Old stock properly al­
locable to the stock of New Corporation. This treatment was upheld 
by the Board of Tax Appeals, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
and, later, the Supreme Court upheld the commissioner’s position that 
the tax should be computed upon the value of the X shares distributed 
as a dividend.
After the Gregory  decision, taxpayers could no longer rely on mere 
literal compliance with the statute in order to achieve a nontaxable re-
36. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1 9 3 5 ), 35-1  U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9043, affg. 
69 F.2d 809 (2d  Cir. 1934), 1934 CCH ¶9180.
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organization. The tax-saving motive alone, unbolstered by a bona fide 
intent to carry out genuine reorganization, was not sufficient to justify 
the statutory exemptions. On the other hand, the mere existence of a 
tax-saving motive would not serve to render an otherwise nontaxable 
transaction taxable. The often-quoted circuit court opinion, delivered 
by Judge Learned Hand, is perhaps one of the best descriptions of the 
business purpose doctrine:
A transaction, otherwise within an exemption of the tax law does not 
lose its immunity, because it is actuated  by a desire to avoid, or, if one 
choose, to evade taxation. Anyone m ay so arrange his affairs that his 
taxes should be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern  
which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to 
increase one’s taxes. . . . But underlying presumption is plain that the 
readjustment shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct 
of the venture at hand, not as an ephem eral incident, egregious to its 
prosecution. To dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not one of the transac­
tions contem plated as corporate "Teorganization.”
Another aspect of the test of business purpose is whether the busi­
ness purpose may reflect that of the shareholder as opposed to that of 
the corporation. In Bazley v. Comm., the court implied that the benefit 
to the corporation must be direct and substantial.37 In more recent 
cases, however, courts have held that a shareholder business purpose 
would be sufficient ( other than merely a purpose to avoid taxes).38
The "Step Transaction" Doctrine
This judicial doctrine was developed and emphasized by the courts 
to determine whether a series of related transactions amounted to a re­
organization. When there is a series of transactions that, if viewed 
separately would give one tax result, but if viewed together would 
yield another, different tax result, the question arises whether the steps 
are interdependent or unrelated. If they are interdependent the courts 
often state that an integrated transaction must not be broken into its 
constituent steps or that the separate steps must be fused in determin­
ing the overall tax consequences of the transaction.39
37. Bazley v. Comm., 331 U.S. 737 (1 9 4 7 ), 4 7 -1  U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9288.
38. See Estate of Moses L. Parshelsky, 303 F.2d 14 (2d  Cir. 1962), 6 2 -1  U.S. Tax 
Cas. ¶9460 and Lewis v. Comm., 176 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1949), 4 9 -2  U.S. Tax 
Cas. ¶9377.
39. For illustrations of the multifaceted aspects of this principle, see Comm. v. 
Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1 9 6 8 ), 6 8 -1  U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9383; Helvering v. Elkhorn 
Coal Co., 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1938), 3 8 -1  U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9238; and American 
Potash and Chemical Co. v. U.S., 185 Ct. Cl. 186 (1 9 6 8 ), 6 8 -2  U.S. Tax Cas. 
¶9650.
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The various anti-tax-avoidance doctrines often overlap. For exam­
ple, under the step transaction doctrine Mrs. Gregory’s “reorganization” 
was clearly nothing more than a distribution of the X  stock.
Current Reorganization Provisions
The tax-free reorganization is only one of several methods of ac­
quiring the stock or assets of a corporation. Alternatively, they may be 
purchased, or they may be acquired in a stock redemption or in a cor­
porate liquidation. The primary differences between a tax-free reorga­
nization and a taxable acquisition are the character of the consideration 
given by the acquiring corporation, and compliance or noncompliance 
with the statutory requirements of a reorganization. In a reorganiza­
tion, the principal, if not the sole, consideration for the acquired stock 
or properties is stock. In a reorganization, all or substantially all of a 
corporation’s property or stock must be acquired, while the buyer in a 
taxable transaction can be much more selective, acquiring only the de­
sired assets and leaving any unwanted assets in the hands of the seller(s). 
The tax results of a nontaxable reorganization are as follows:40
1. Neither gain nor loss is recognized by the acquiring corporation.41 
Property received by the acquiring corporation retains the basis it 
had in the hands of the transferor, increased by the amount of gain, 
if any, recognized by the transferor on the transfer.42 In some ac­
quisition-type reorganizations, certain tax features of the acquired 
corporation are carried over to the acquiring or “successor” corpora­
tion under rules described later in this appendix.
2. No gain or loss is recognized by the transferor corporation on the 
exchange of property pursuant to a tax-free reorganization.43 But if, 
in addition to the stock or securities of the acquiring corporation, 
the transferor corporation receives boot in the exchange, gain, but 
not loss, is recognized to the corporation unless the property is dis­
tributed to its shareholders.44
40. A wide range of alternative methods is available for acquiring and disposing 
of a corporate business. Selecting the appropriate method requires careful examina­
tion and evaluation of the numerous tax and nontax factors associated with each 
alternative. An excellent discussion of these important considerations is presented 
in Zolman Cavitch, Tax Planning for Corporations and Shareholders (New York: 
Matthew Bender, 1977), Ch. 10.
41. Sec. 1 0 3 2 (a ).
42. Sec. 3 6 2 (b ).
43. Sec. 3 6 1 (a ) .
44. Sec. 3 6 1 (b ).
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3. Unless they receive boot in addition to stock or securities, no gain 
or loss is generally recognized to the stock or security holders of the 
corporations involved in the reorganization when they exchange 
their stock and securities for those of another corporation.45 How­
ever, if a holder receives a larger principal amount of securities 
(that is, long-term debt) than he surrenders, the fair market value 
of the excess principal is treated as boot.46 If additional considera­
tion is received, gain, but not loss, is recognized limited to the 
money plus the fair market value of other property received, or the 
realized gain, whichever is less.47 If the distribution has the effect 
of a dividend distribution, any recognized gain is treated as a tax­
able dividend to the extent of the recipient’s share of the corpora­
tion’s accumulated earnings and p r o f i t s .48 The remainder is treated  
as gain from an exchange of property. The tax basis of the stock 
and securities received by the holders pursuant to the reorganiza­
tion will be the same as the basis of those surrendered, minus the 
amount of cash and value of other property received, minus any 
relief from, or assumption of, their liabilities, plus the amount of 
any gain and dividend income recognized on the transaction.49
"Acquisition-Type" Reorganizations
Type A Reorganizations: Statutory M erger or Consolidation
A  type A reorganization is the merger or consolidation of two or 
more corporations pursuant to the procedure set forth in the corporate
45. Sec. 3 5 4 (a )  ( 1 ) .
46. Secs. 3 5 4 ( a ) ( 2 )  and 3 5 6 (d ).
47. Sec. 3 5 6 (a )  (1 ) .
48. Sec. 3 5 6 (a )  ( 2 ) .
49. Sec. 358. These rules are illustrated in the following example: T, an individual, 
exchanges stock he owns in A Corporation for stock in B Corporation plus $4,000 
cash. The exchange is pursuant to a tax-free reorganization of A and B. T paid 
$20,000 for the stock in A Corporation six years ago. The stock in B has a fair 
market value of $24,000. T has a realized gain of $8,000 ($24,000 + $4,000 -  
$20 ,000), which is recognized to the extent of the “boot” received—$4,000. If the 
distribution has the effect of a dividend, and if T ’s share of earnings and profits 
in A is $1,000, then $1,000 of the recognized gain would be a taxable dividend. 
The remaining $3,000 would be treated as a gain from the exchange of property. 
T’s basis in the B stock would be $20,000 ($20 ,000  ( basis in stock surrendered) -  
$4,000 ( boot received) + $4,000 ( gain and dividend income recognized) ) .
If T’s basis in the A stock had been $35,000, he would have a realized loss of 
$7,000 on the exchange, none of which would be recognized. His basis in the B 
stock would be $31,000 ($35 ,000  (basis in stock surrendered) -  $4,000 (boot 
received) ) .
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law of the relevant state or states.50 The diff erence between the two 
methods of combining corporations is one of form. In a merger, two or 
more corporations are combined and one of the existing corporations 
continues as the same legal entity. Thus, if M Corporation is merged 
into O Corporation, M Corporation disappears in the transaction, but 
O, the surviving corporation, continues with the combined businesses. 
The shareholders of M receive stock or securities in O; the holdings of 
the O shareholders are not changed. In a consolidation, two or more 
existing corporations all disappear into a new corporation, which comes 
into existence at the time of, and incident to, the consolidation pro­
cedure. If P Corporation and Q Corporation, for example, are to be 
combined by way of statutory consolidation, a new corporation, Cor­
poration R, will be created into which both P and Q will disappear. 
The shareholders in both P and Q will receive stock or securities in R.
One of the chief advantages of a type A reorganization is that it 
allows greater flexibility than other types of reorganizations because 
the consideration need not be voting s t o c k . 51 The “A” reorganization 
thus permits money or other property to change hands without dis­
qualifying the combination as a tax-free reorganization. Although the 
money or other property will constitute boot and gain may have to be 
recognized by the recipients, it will not prevent the transaction from 
being a reorganization with the tax advantages and drawbacks de­
scribed here (unless the stockholders of the disappearing corporation(s) 
receive so much boot that they fail to meet the continuity-of-interest 
test described above). The present position of the Internal Revenue 
Service is that the continuity-of-interest test will be met if the total 
stock received by the shareholders of the disappearing corporation is 
worth at least 50 percent of the total consideration received for all of 
the outstanding stock of the disappearing corporation.52
There are also disadvantages to the type A reorganization. Full 
compliance with applicable state law is required. In many cases this 
can cause problems. F or example, in most states the shareholders of all 
corporations participating in a merger or consolidation are granted the
50. Sec. 368(a)(1)(A ).
51. Voting stock is required in both type B and type C reorganizations, infra.
52. Rev. proc. 74 -2 6 , 1974-2  C.B. 478. Note that “it is not necessary that each 
shareholder of the transferor, or acquired corporation receive in the exchange stock 
of the acquiring or transferee corporation which is equal to at least 50 percent of 
the value of his former stock interest in the acquired or transferor corporation, 
so long as one or more of the shareholders of the acquired or transferor corpora­
tion have a continuing interest through stock ownership of the acquiring or trans­
feree corporation . . . which is, in the aggregate, equal in value to at least 50  
percent of the value of all of the formerly outstanding stock of the acquired or 
transferor corporation.”
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right to dissent and have their shares redeemed. The expenses of proxy 
statements and special meetings of shareholders can run high.
Another important disadvantage of the type A reorganization is that 
in most states, the surviving corporation assumes the liabilities, includ­
ing contingent and unknown liabilities, of the acquired corporation as 
a m atter of law.
Many of the problems associated with mergers and consolidations 
can be reduced or eliminated if a subsidiary rather than its parent be­
comes the acquiring corporation. Causing a subsidiary to make the ac­
quisition protects the parent’s assets from the liabilities of the acquired 
corporation. It usually has the further advantage of not requiring a 
vote of the parent’s shareholders, since the parent itself is the sole 
stockholder of the subsidiary. Consequently, only the approval of the 
parent’s board of directors need be obtained. Although the subsidiary 
could give its own stock in the transaction, the shareholders of the ac­
quired corporation usually want stock in the parent and the parent 
prefers full ownership of its subsidiary.
Before 1968, a statutory merger into a subsidiary in exchange for 
the parent’s stock did not qualify as a type A reorganization. Section 
3 6 8 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( D )  now permits these “triangular” mergers provided that 
the parent is in “control” of the subsidiary, that no subsidiary stock 
is used, and that the exchange would have been a type A reorganiza­
tion if the merger had been into the parent, as illustrated below.
M erger
End up with 
parent stock
Alpha Corporation loses its 
existence by operation of law
53. Sec. 3 6 8 (c )  defines control as the ownership of at least 80 percent of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 
80  percent of the number of shares of all other classes of stock.
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Corporation
Alpha
Corporation
Alpha’s
Shareholders
Merges into
Transfers stock 
_ _ in Parent
Parent
Corporation
Beta
Corporation
Ends up with 
Alpha's assets 
and business
In 1971, section 3 6 8 (a )  ( 2 )  ( E )  was enacted to treat a so-called “re­
verse triangular” merger as a reorganization. In such a merger, the ac­
quired corporation remains in existence, the subsidiary is merged into 
it, the acquired corporation’s shareholders receive parent stock, and the 
acquired corporation becomes a subsidiary of the parent. To qualify 
under this provision, the surviving acquired corporation must hold, in 
addition to its own properties, substantially all of the merged sub­
sidiary’s properties, and the former shareholders must receive voting 
stock of the controlling parent corporation in exchange for 80 percent 
control of the surviving corporation, as illustrated below.
Reverse Merger
Beta Corporation loses its 
existence by operation of law. 
Alpha becomes subsidiary of Parent
Type B Reorganizations: Stock-for-Stock Acquisitions
The type B reorganization, generally used to create or perfect a 
parent-subsidiary relationship, involves the acquisition by a corporation 
of the stock of another corporation solely in exchange for its voting 
stock or solely in exchange for the voting stock of a corporation in con­
trol of the acquiring corporation. “Immediately after the acquisition,” 
the acquiring corporation must be in control of the acquired corpora­
tion. The solely-voting-stock requirement is strictly construed by the 
c o u r t s . 54 Thus, no boot can be given in a type B reorganization.
The requirement that the acquiring corporation be in control of the 
acquired corporation does not mean that the acquiring corporation
54. In Helvering v. Southwest Consolidated Corp., 315 U.S. 194 (1 9 4 2 ) , 4 2 -1  
U.S. Tax Cas. ¶9248, the Supreme Court asserted that the “solely” requirement 
was added to the statute to assure that the reorganization provisions would not be 
used as a method of “selling a business tax-free. . . . ‘Solely’ leaves no leeway. 
Voting stock and some other consideration does not meet the statutory re­
quirement.”
66
Alpha’s
Shareholders
Alpha
Corporation
Voting Stock of Parent
Stock Representing 
Control of Alpha
Substantially All
Beta’s Assets
Parent
Corporation
Beta
Corporation
must necessarily acquire 80 percent of the acquired corporation’s stock 
in the transaction itself. Control need not be obtained through a single 
transaction. A “creeping” acquisition will qualify, as well as an increase 
in ownership by a corporation which already has control. Thus, if 
X  Corporation, in four successive and separate transactions, acquired 
( solely for voting stock) 20 percent, 40 percent, 20 percent, and finally 
10 percent of the stock of Y Corporation, the last two exchanges would 
qualify as type B reorganizations.
A problem arises when an earlier acquisition was made for a con­
sideration other than voting stock, and then in a later transaction the 
acquiring corporation obtains control using only its voting stock. To 
illustrate, assume that, in January, Z Corporation acquires 20 percent 
of the stock of Y Corporation for cash. In December of the same year, 
Z exchanges its voting stock for 60 percent of the Y stock and thereby 
acquires 80 percent control. If the two transactions are independent of 
one another, the requirements of a type B reorganization have been 
satisfied and no gain or loss is recognized to the exchanging share­
holders in the latter exchange. On the other hand, if both transactions 
are part of the same plan, they will be viewed as a single transaction 
under the step transaction doctrine, and the cash consideration will dis­
qualify the later exchange from nontaxability. The regulations permit 
a prior cash purchase to be disregarded if it was independent of the 
stock-for-stock exchange; but stock-for-stock acquisitions in a series are 
to be aggregated if they occur “over a relatively short period of time 
such as 12 months.”
The type B reorganization has the advantage of simplicity of form. 
Its major disadvantages are that the consideration is limited to voting 
stock and that the acquiring corporation cannot be sure that it will ob­
tain 100 percent of the acquired corporation’s stock.
Type C Reorganizations: Stock-for-Asset Acquisitions
A  type C reorganization is an acquisition by one corporation of sub­
stantially all the properties of another corporation in exchange solely 
for the voting stock of the acquiring corporation or its parent.56 In a 
type C reorganization, the exchange of assets for stock by the acquired
55. Reg. sec. 1 .3 6 8 -2 (c ) .
56. Sec. 368(a)(1)(C ). Consideration in the type C reorganization must nor­
mally consist of voting stock, as in the type B reorganization. However, sec. 368 ( a ) 
(2 )(B ) permits the use of cash or other property as part consideration if at 
least 80 percent of the fair market value of all property of the acquired corpora­
tion is obtained through the use of voting stock. The assumption of the acquired 
corporation’s liabilities is disregarded in determining whether the transaction is 
“solely for voting stock,” but is treated as “other property” for the purpose of 
applying the 80 percent test of section 368(a)(2)(B ).
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corporation will not be taxable to it. If, as is usually the case, the ac­
quired corporation is then liquidated pursuant to the plan of reorgani­
zation, the receipt of the acquiring corporation’s stock by the acquired 
corporation’s shareholders will be nontaxable to them as well.57 The 
type C reorganization is distinguished from the type B in that the type 
C involves the acquisition of the business of the acquired corporation, 
rather than its stock.
The type C reorganization is similar to the type A. Although the 
rules concerning consideration are more restrictive in the type C, this 
latter method of acquisition is sometimes preferable to the type A. For 
example, in the type C, unlike the type A, the acquiring corporation 
can control what liabilities it chooses to assume. Thus, it can insulate 
itself from the unknown or contingent liabilities of the acquired cor­
poration, provided it is careful to comply with the various creditor pro­
tection laws such as the “bulk sales” statutes. Another advantage of the 
type C reorganization is that usually only the acquired corporation’s 
shareholders need to vote on the plan and dissenter’s rights are avail­
able only to them.
A disadvantage of the type G reorganization is that it requires the 
acquisition of “substantially all” of the acquired corporation’s assets. 
Many compliance problems develop in determining whether this re­
quirement has been satisfied where the acquiring corporation does not 
want some of the assets of the acquired corporation. There are no 
statutory guidelines for determining what constitutes “substantially all”; 
the Internal Revenue Service requires that assets representing at least 
90 percent of the fair market value of the net assets, and at least 70  
percent of the fair market value of the gross assets, held by the ac­
quired corporation be transferred to the acquiring corporation in order 
for the parties to obtain a favorable ruling.58
Carryover of Tax Attributes
Section 381 provides an exception to the rule that only a corpora­
tion’s own tax attributes and carryovers are available to it. In most ac­
quisition-type reorganizations in which assets are acquired, the acquir­
ing corporation succeeds to the tax characteristics of the transferor 
corporation. Section 381 requires successor corporations to take limited 
carryovers of their predecessors’ tax benefits, privileges, elective rights, 
and obligations when assets are acquired in specified tax-free reorgani-
57. Secs. 3 5 4 (a )(1 ) and 3 6 1 (a ) .
58. Rev. proc. 74-26 , 1974-2  C.B. 478.
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zations.59 Examples of these tax benefits and burdens are the net oper­
ating loss carryforward of the acquired corporation, its capital loss 
carryforward, accounting methods, depreciation methods, inventory 
methods, unused charitable contribution deduction carryforwards, un­
used investment credit carryforwards, and so forth. The carryover of 
certain favorable items may be limited or even precluded under special 
rules contained in sections 381 through 383 and section 269.
59,
1.
2 .
3.
4.
These carryovers apply in the following types of reorganizations:
A statutory merger or consolidation (type A ).
A stock-for-assets acquisition ( type C ).
A type D reorganization (if substantially all the assets are acquired, and if 
the transferor distributes all its remaining assets and the consideration received 
from the transferee).
A mere change in identity, form, or place of organization ( type F ).
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